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AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
The research and writing of a Master's thesis is an
important milestone in the academic training of a young grad-
uate student. It marks the final test in which the candidate
demonstrates talents and skills developed by long hours of
classroom and individual study. For the aspiring historian
the years have witnessed dedication in learning the vast
storehouse of knowledge found in the literature of the stu-
dent's specialization. However there must come a time in
the graduate student's professional training when the books
are set aside and "history" is actually experienced in a
deeply personal way. Such an event took place in the life
of the author at the Ft. Riley, Kansas Post Cemetery.
On 30 June 1986, a brief but formal military ceremony
took place at the 1st "Big Red One" Infantry Division's
cemetery in which the remains of three buried Imperial Jap-
anese Navy sailors were returned to the Japanese Government
for disinterment, cremation, and restoration to their fami-
lies and homeland. Of special interest to the author was
the branch of service within the Imperial Navy in which these
three men served their country: submarines. All three
sailors were members of the crew of the 988-ton submarine
RO-61 during World War II. RO-61 began the war as one of
three boats assigned to the 26th Submarine Division, a
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member of the 7th Submarine Squadron, Fourth Fleet station-
ed in the Japanese Mandate Islands of the central Pacific.
The submarine participated in the second assault upon Wake
Island in late December 1941 and later assisted other boats
of 7th Squadron in unsuccessfully defending the Marshall and
Gilbert Islands from hit-and-run U.S. carrier raids in early
February 1942.
On 14 July 1942, four days after the reorganization of
the Combined Fleet following the disastrous Midway battle,
RO-61 and six other submarines comprising the 26th and 33rd
Submarine Divisions were reassigned to the Fifth Fleet based
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at Kiska in the captured Aleutians. According to the post-
war Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee study on Japanese
naval and merchant shipping losses, RO-61 was attacked and
sunk on 31 August 1942 by U.S. land-based aircraft and surface
craft at 52°36'N latitude and 173°57*W longitude, somewhere
in the vicinity south of the central Aleutian chain off the
coast of Alaska. Further investigation reveals that RO-61 's
last battle began earlier in the day when it successfully
sank the U.S. seaplane tender CASCO, anchored inside Nazan
Bay, Atka Island. Judging from the ranks of the three sea-
men—a chief gunner's mate, a warrant officer, and a "private"
(seaman) first class—and the fact that they were apparently
the sole survivors of the 60-man crew suggests the submarine
was cruising on the surface with the three sailors standing
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lookout or manning the single 3-inch/76ram deck gun when
attacked and sunk by the combined efforts of naval aircraft
and the destroyer REID. No doubt R0-61's captain desparately
tried to make good his boat's escape by utilizing its 16-knot
maximum surface speed, while at the same time insuring the
batteries were fully charged in anticipation of continuing
the battle beneath the ocean's waves. In any case, the
three survivors were captured and interned for the war's
duration in a prisoner of war encampment somewhere in Colorado.
However the three sailors died in a Denver hospital on 29
October 1944 and were buried at Camp Carson (now Ft. Carson),
Colorado until moved to the Ft. Riley Post Cemetery as part
of a U.S. Army effort to consolidate prisoner of war remains
in a single location on 23 January 1946.
A curious feature in this story is the apparent coinci-
dence in the date of death for all three sailors; over two
years after their capture. Why the same date? Quiet inves-
tigation soon turned up a possible solution to this vexing
question. Speaking off the record, a member of the public
affairs office at Ft. Riley indicated the three men were shot
as they attacked a camp guard. Later, in casual conversation
with the mortician retained by the Japanese Government to
supervise the disinterment, cremation, and delivery of the
ashes to the Consulate General in Kansas City, the author
learned the three submariners had indeed died as a result of
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4gunshot wounds. These tidbits of information suggest the
three survivors of RO-61 died as a result of either a failed
escape attempt or perhaps in retaliating against a tyrannical
camp guard. Whatever the cause which ended in death for the
RO-61 trio, 41 years of peace and friendship between the
United States and Japan could not—and should not—-be allowed
to interfere with judicious diplomacy.
But the story did not end with the deaths of three
Japanese prisoners of war in a Denver hospital. In 1963 a
member of Japan's Self-Defense Force, studying at Ft. Leaven-
worth's Command and General Staff College, discovered the
tombstones of the RO-61 trio and launched a twenty-three
year effort to return their remains home. Armed with infor-
mation supplied by the Department of the Army, the Japanese
Ministry of Health and Welfare successfully tracked down
surviving family members of the RO-61 trio, all of whom joy-
fully requested the return of their loved ones. Thus after
forty-four years of exile in a foreign land, the RO-61 trio
were at last going home.
This entire episode will be remembered as another foot-
note in the history of the Second World War. But to the
author it will always hold special emotional meaning because
on 30 June 1986, military history came "alive" in the life
of this apprentice military historian.
Therefore, because of the author's four-year residency
in Japan as the son of Baptist missionaries, the numerous
trips "home", and the consequent deep emotional ties with
that ancient Oriental land, I respectfully dedicate this
Master's thesis in memory of Chief Gunner's Mate Kazunorl
Makino, Warrant Officer Saburo Nakagawa, and "Private"
(Seaman) First Class Sadamu Okada. These three submariners
represent the thousands of officers and men on both sides
who fought valiantly aboard submarines during the Pacific
War between the United States of America and Imperial Japan.
It is appropriate that the RO-61 trio open the study which
follows.
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Most of the information in this introduction is taken
from a press release issued on 24 June 1986 by the Consolate
General of Japan in Kansas City, Missouri. Additional infor-
mation may be found in newspaper articles of the Manhattan
Mercury (Manhattan, Kansas) for 27 June and 1 July 1986.
R0-61's war record and statistical data is compiled
from: Dorr Carpenter and Norman Polmar, Submarines of the
Imperial Japanese Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1986), pp. 12, 17, 27-28, 121-22; Erminio Bagnasco, Submarines
of World War Two (1973; reprint ed., Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1985), p. 180; Anthony J. Watts, Japanese
Warships of World War II (London: Ian Allen, 1966), pp. 165-
167, 380; and Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese
Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by all
Causes (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), p. 3.
In respect of the Army official's delicate position,
the individual's identity shall remain anonymous.
A
Conversation between the author and Bill Yorgensen of
Cowan-Edwards-Yorgensen Funeral Home, Manhattan, Kansas on
30 June 1986.
SUBMARINE WARFARE AND
NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION , 1921-1936
In time, the first half of the twentieth century will
be most remembered as a period in which two global wars were
fought. The first of these conflicts, "The Great War," or
World War I, was largely limited to the European Continent,
whereas World War II was truly global in character. Ironi-
cally the seeds of strife resulting in World War II were
sown in the disrupted economies and societies and poorly
constructed armistace of the First, "the war to end all wars".
However it would be incorrect to consider World War II as a
single conflict. In reality that event can be divided into
two separate but related wars. The European Theater was
for the most part a continuation of World War I with the
addition of technological improvements in weaponry and
military science. Like its predecessor, the battlefields
were primarily on land, although an equally violent war of
attrition was waged once more for control of the Atlantic
Ocean.
The Pacific Theater was an entirely different struggle
characterized by the embattled forces fighting one another
largely in a maritime environment. The Pacific War between
Japan and the United States was heavily influenced by the
outcome of World War I but it would be wrong to conclude that,
like the war in Europe, the second conflict was a continuation
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of the first. The Pacific War was above all else a fight
between two nations—the United States and Imperial Japan
—
even though the struggle eventually included a coalition
of nations against the lone Axis combatant.
The elements of the Pacific War (1941-1945) were estab-
lished in the mid-nineteenth century when the young, aggres-
sive United States looked westward across the Pacific Ocean
towards the Asian mainland, particularly China. At first,
commerce and trade with the Orient were America's motivation.
This economic thrust was strengthened in 1867 with the
purchase from Imperial Russia of the vast, untamed territory
of Alaska and the annexation of the Midway Islands in the
central North Pacific. These preliminary territorial hold-
ings were enlarged in 1898 when the United States waged a
brief, but successful, war against the aging and enfeebled
Spanish Empire. In seizing Spanish colonial possessions in
the Philippines and Guam, the United States established its
authority and influence in the eastern Pacific.
At the same time an Asian military power was emerging
from relative obscurity. Feudal Japan had been forcibly
introduced to the West in 1853-54 with the arrival of the
famous Black Ships commanded by Commodore Matthew C. Perry
off the northeast coast of Asia and ending centuries of
self-imposed isolation on the Japanese archipelago. Quickly
realizing the technological disparity between the West and
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themselves, the Japanese set about transforming their society
from its feudal past into the industrial future. The success
of this conversion was soon made apparent by its military
victories over much stronger opponents in wars with China
(1894-95) and Russia (1904-05).
The United States initially viewed Japan's growing
military power with favor. It represented a counterweight to
the imperial ambitions of Russia and Germany in the Far East.
This balance of power was further enhanced when Japan signed
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain on
30 January 1902. However U.S. approval turned quickly into
concern after Japan's decisive defeat of the Russian Fleet at
Tsushima and subsequent victory in the Russo-Japanese War
dramatically altered the Pacific balance of power. American
apprehension increased as a result of the heated naval arms
race in Europe between Britain and Germany. When both
European naval powers withdrew their warships to Continental
waters, the Angle—Japanese Alliance gave Japan the freedom
to pursue its own territorial ambitions in the Far East with-
out fear of direct or immediate European intervention.
After Europe went to war in August 1914 the U.S.-Japan
rivalry in the Pacific intensified. World War I presented
the Japanese with a golden opportunity to increase their
power and influence in the region while at the same time
providing the legal authority under the Alliance to seize
German possessions on the Chinese mainland and in the central
Pacific.
Across the ocean, the American voter perceived that
naval strength would be a critical element in the postwar
world. Thus concern over Japan's aggressive movements into
the central Pacific, coupled with a potential naval threat
posed by the victor in Europe and observation of warfare's
violent cause-and-effect nature, resulted in popular support
for the Naval Act of 1916, which called for construction of
the largest and most powerful fleet in the world. In effect,
a new naval power had entered the world stage.
As the guns of August fell silent across the Western
Front, it quickly became apparent that the Great War had
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altered the shape of international seapower. The stability
and hegemony fostered by the Royal Navy's century-long
Pax Britannlca was over as a result of technological improve-
ments in naval science and the rise of naval powers in the
United States and Japan, countries well beyond the European
chokepoints. Wartime construction had greatly increased the
fleets of all three postwar maritime powers. Although Britain
still retained superiority over the other two separately, the
Royal Navy could no longer maintain absolute sway everywhere
on the high seas. All three navies were individually strong
enough to dominate the seas in their respective regions:
Great Britain in European waters, the United States in the
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western Atlantic, Caribbean, and eastern Pacific, and Japan
In the distant western Pacific. However, the financial
burden was too great to build overwhelming naval superiority
in order to defeat any one of the other fleets in its home
waters. Compounding the problem, all three naval powers had
colonies and commercial interests within the spheres of
influence of the others: the U.S. with its Pacific island
possessions, Britain and Its world wide empire, and Japanese
immigration into the western United States.
The events which led to the outbreak of World War I
strongly indicated that a strictly military solution to a
nation's problems was no longer possible or desirable because
of the tremendous financial burdens or in terms of human
costs. First, any new arms race risked either war or fiscal
insolvency as witnessed by the Anglo-German naval arras race
in the years before the war. Second, a naval arms race
between two of the three postwar naval powers would no doubt
stimulate construction in the third in order to maintain a
position of rough parity. Third, a fiercely competitive
mentality Implied a direct military challenge and threat to
the other powers. Finally, national tradition, pride, and
prestige galvanized demands for a naval buildup.
Prospects of a new naval arms race developed quickly
after World War I. For a short time Great Britain, financially
exhausted by the war, stopped construction of capital ships
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altogether. However the British soon became alarmed at the
United States' increased building as a result of the Naval
Act of 1916. British fears of a new arms race were partially
alleviated in 1919 when the U.S. divided its fleet between
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Now the Japanese quickly
realized they faced an immediate naval rival. As a result
Japan launched new building programs at a time when the
British were financially unable to compete.
This potentially explosive situation continued until
1921, by which time the naval budgets of all three powers
had become alarmingly expensive. The public in all three
nations yearned for immediate reductions in the inflated
armaments budgets widely seen as a repetition of the mistake
which contributed to the beginning of World War I. There
was popular disillusionment with warfare as an end in itself
thus creating an atmosphere in all three nations making a
disarmament conference possible.
On 12 November 1921, the Conference on the Limitation
of Armaments convened in Washington, D.C. The two goals of
the conference were to seek an across-the-board limitation
on all land and naval armaments and to end the squabbling
over colonial possessions in the Far East. As a result,
however, of French opposition to any discussion of land-
based armamants, the meeting quickly turned towards naval
3
armaments.
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After lengthy and complex negotiations, the conference
reached agreement among the five major powers (the United
States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) to limit the
displacement size and number of the most powerful and
expensive warship category: the capital ship, a term describ-
ing both the all big-gunned and heavily armored battleship
and the fledgling aircraft carrier. The Five-Power Treaty
placed maximum limits on the total tonnage each nation could
maintain, a maximum tonnage limit on individual ship and
gun caliber size, and a ten-year construction holiday in which
no new capital shipping would be built. Unfortunately the
conference failed to arrive at agreements limiting other
warship categories as well; and therein lay the chief weak-
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ness of the Five-Power Treaty.
One author has suggested the principal failure of the
Washington Naval Conference was in the delegates* inability
to limit the construction of submarines. This issue, he
argued, was the vital element in obtaining an agreement on
all other warship classes. The very fact that some countries,
most notably France, considered the submarine an important
warship category weakened the overall effect of the limita-
tions process by acknowledging the existence of disagreement
on the value of battleships and aircraft carriers as the
backbone of naval power. In other words, now that capital
ships were subject to limitations in size and number, the
failure to reach mutual agreement on secondary warship classes
served only to increase their relative importance within the
respective fleets. In essence, the treaty controlling subma-
rine warfare, the Treaty Regarding the Use of Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare, was enforceable only through the
whims of world public opinion. Thus without specific
restrictions on the smaller warships, the Washington Naval
Conference succeeded in reducing one naval arms race while
giving impetus to another.
Great Britain, the U.S., Japan, France, and Italy all
approached the submarine question from radically different
positions. Britain alone favored the total abolition of
the submarine as a legitimate weapon of war as a result of
its recent near-disastrous experience against German U-boats.
The United States on the other hand opposed abolition despite
strong domestic sentiment to do so primarily because the
Navy's governing body, the General Board, envisioned the
submarine as "an inexpensive means of defending outlying
island possessions." France supported the U.S. position
since the submarine promised to break any British blockade
of the Continent and threaten its long-standing naval
hegemony. Italy tacitly followed the French lead based on
regional considerations in the Mediterranean Sea where
France and Britain maintained powerful fleets. Japan
supported the submarine as well because it believed that as
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a weapon of attrition, the submarine would be useful in
weakening an enemy fleet as it crossed the Pacific Ocean and
as a blockade breaker in defense of its newly acquired
insular possessions.
Discussion of submarines began when U.S. Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes proposed that both Britain and
the United States limit their submarine fleets to a maximum
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of 90,000 tons while Japan would be permitted 54,000 tons.
In the event that any of the conferees' submarine fleet ton-
nage exceeded the maximum proposals as of 11 November 1921,
they would not be required to scrap the excess until replace-
ment vessels were built. At that time all new construction
would be limited by the proposed limits. Other exemptions
included the completion as scheduled of boats with keels
laid before 11 November and the restriction of new construc-
tion to replacement vessels only during the building holiday
unless a nation had not yet reached its allowable maximum.
Hughes proposed that replacement vessels not be built
until twelve years after existing submarines had been
constructed and that a replacement keel should not be laid
until the older boat had reached age eleven. In addition,
older vessels would be required to be scrapped within three
months of the date of completion of its replacement. If
construction delays were encountered in building the re-
placement, scrapping would have to take place within four
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years of laying the keel.
Britain and France hotly debated the issue of abollsh-
9
ing submarines. Hughes tried to work out a quiet understand-
ing which would alleviate British concern over French
intransigence. He believed the latter' s stubborn position
would force the break-up of the entire conference. Accord-
ingly, the American secretary recommended to Britain's
Lord A. J. Balfour two changes in the form of lower tonnage
allowances and the formulation of rules for submarine use in
time of war. Balfour rejected these suggestions because the
British public supported abolition. Instead, he applied
pressure on the pro-submarine delegates by publicly arguing
that submarine warfare itself was immoral. Another member
of the British delegation, Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord
of the Admiralty, added his own voice to Balfour's argument
with a public attack on an article written by a French naval
officer which supported developing the submarine as a means
of breaking British naval power.
The Franco-British dispute as well as the conference's
general inability to agree on the question of submarine
abolition or numerical limitation quickly poisoned the
diplomatic atmosphere. A way out of the dilemma appeared
when a member of the United States' delegation, Senator and
former Secretary of State and of War Elihu Root, suggested
that a set of rules be developed to govern the use of
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submarines in time of war. Almost immediately Japan, France,
and Italy raised questions about the disposition of Q-shlps
—
warships disguised as merchant vessels but specifically
designed to attack submarines—and the manner in which these
vessels would be tolerated if submarines were required to
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identify and board all victims prior to sinking them.
An advisory committee to the U.S. delegation formulated
the American stance on submarine warfare in a report present-
ed on 1 December 1921. Hughes read the report to the other
conference delegations which emphasized the need for rules
controlling acceptable conduct in submarine warfare and yet
arguing that the vessel was a legitimate weapons platform.
He began by tracing the evolution of submarine warfare during
World War I. Hughes revealed that "unlimited warfare," that
is, attacking merchant shipping without warning or attempt to
rescue survivors had not been limited to submarines alone.
All naval vessels were expected to follow the traditional
rule which required that a suspected enemy ship be boarded
and, if possible, seized by a prize crew and sailed to a
friendly or neutral port. The modern submarine could not
carry out this practice because of its limited space for the
extra manpower to man prize crews and house the captured
passengers and crews of hostile vessels. Furthermore,
surfaced submarines were extremely vulnerable to naval gunfire
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from illegal Q-shlps while exercising the right of visitation.
Submarine commanders were thus predisposed to sink targets
without warning. In response to this sinister policy,
merchant vessels began arming themselves against submarine
attack (in itself a violation of the rules of conduct) and
both hunter and hunted soon practised a policy of sink-on-
sight. Hughes concluded that new rules governing the conduct
of submarine warfare were needed, otherwise naval warfare
would become even more brutal.
However Secretary Hughes noted that when a submarine
attacked a surface warship, no warning would be needed or
expected. In this observation the report recognized the
fact that "the submarine has come to stay." Ironically, the
committee piously reaffirmed America's repugnance for the
World War I practice of submarine warfare in words that
would one day return to haunt it: "The United States
would never desire its Navy to undertake unlimited submarine
warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people
would bring about the downfall of the administration which
12
attempted to sanction its use."
Hughes argued against abolition of the submarine for
two reasons. On the strategic level, the submarine was
considered useful in defending distant American possessions
until the entire fleet could arrive en masse. Closer to
home, submarines could protect the U.S. coastline from
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surprise attack or enemy raids. Submarine development also
made sound fiscal sense. Not only were these warships cheap-
er to build, they could also fulfill the traditional role of
the cruiser in reconnaissance. In short a large submarine
fleet provided an inexpensive means to wage war at sea:
"The cost per annum of maintaing 100,000 tons of submarines
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fully manned and ready is about S30,000,000."
The report finished with the recommendations that the
practice of unlimited submarine warfare be outlawed and the
right of visitation and search be the same as that observed
by surface warships. Furthermore, it stated that there
should be no limitations on the size of the individual
submarine boat.
Japan was also interested in establishing rules of
conduct rather than abolition of the submarine. On 22 De-.
cember 1921, Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Mlnister for Foreign
Affairs and a member of the Japanese delegation agreed with
a British statement that "the sinking of merchant vessels
without proper warning had no justification whatever" and
14
called for rules to limit such action. Hanihara did take
exception to the British view of submarines as illegitimate
defensive weapons, but after referring to the popular
conception of the submarine as a malevolent, predatory
warship hidden beneath the ocean waves and striking defense-
less merchant targets without warning, he asserted that the
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submarine had legitimate uses, such as coastal defense in the
role of "movable mines." He also argued that the labeling of
submarines as an "illegitimate weapon" was unfounded since
"any weapon might become illegitimate if used without re-
striction." Therefore Japan considered the submarine as an
effective and economical warship but in need of a common
standard governing its operational use.
The next week Elihu Root submitted his resolution
proposals for the use of submarine warships in time of war
to the general conference:
I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more
effective the rules adopted by civilized nations
for the protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that
among those rules the following are to be deemed
an established part of international law:
1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to
stop for visit and search to determine
its character before it can be captured.
A merchant vessel must not be attack-
ed unless it refuse to stop for visit and
search after warning.
A merchant vessel must not be destroy-
ed unless the crew and passengers have
been first placed in safety.
2. Belligerent submarines are not under
any circumstances exempt from the univer-
sal rules above stated; and if a submarine
can not capture a merchant vessel in con-
formity with these rules the existing law
of nations requires it to desist from
attack and from capture and to permit the
merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.
The signatory powers invite the adherence
of all other civilized powers to the for-
going statement of established law to the
end that there may be clear public under-
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standing throughout the world of the
standards of conduct by which the public
opinion of the world is to pass judge-
ment upon future belligerents.
II. The signatory powers recognize the practical
impossibility of using submarines as commerce
destroyers without violating the requirements
universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncomba-
tants, and to the end that the prohibition of such
use shall be universally accepted as part of the
law of nations, they declare their assent to such
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere
thereto.
III. The signatory powers, desiring to insure the
enforcement of the humane rules declared by them
with respect to the prohibition of the use of
submarines in warfare, further declare that any
person in the service of any of the powers adopt-
ing these rules who shall violate any of the rules
thus adopted, whether or not such person is under
orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed
to have violated the laws of war, and shall be
liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of
piracy, and may be brought to trial before the
civil or military authorities of any such powers 16
within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.
The conference accepted the Root proposals although it debat-
ed at considerable length about Article Ill's characterizing
violating crews and their boat skippers as pirates.
Thus the Washington Naval Conference addressed the
issue of submarine warfare in the shadow of recent combat
and entertained proposals for outlawing this warship, limit-
ing the tonnage each nation could maintain, and the
individual unit size. But the only agreement it could reach
was the rather idealistic but entirely Impractical and
anachronistic one of retaining established rulse governing
-16-
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the use of the submarine In time of war.
The delegates' attempt at reducing the horrendous Impact
of submarine warfare was commendable but unfortunately doomed
to failure, for within the agreement were planted the seeds
of its destruction. By restricting submarine warfare to an
observance of conventional rules with regard to merchant
shipping, such a standard imposed an "either/or" choice upon
the submarine's tactical employment: following the rules
endangered the vessel and its crew to almost certain destruc-
tion while disregarding them made the submariners pirates and
criminals. This dilemma forced boat commanders and their
superiors on shore to choose between adherence to the treaty,
thereby completely abandoning the submarine's role as a
commerce raider, or wholesale violation of the rules. In
short, the treaty effectively neutralized the submarine as
efficiently as outlawing it. This choice between extremes
tipped the scales in favor of unlimited submarine warfare
and consequently the very barbarization of naval warfare the
18
treaty was supposed to prevent.
What were the results of the Washington Naval Confer-
19
ence? Japan emerged with many advantages, notwithstanding
the views to the contrary of its more militant military and
political leaders, Of major importance was the conference's
failure to reach an agreement limiting the number of second-
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ary naval warships such as cruisers, destroyers, and subma-
rines. This fact, together with the restrictions on capital
shipping, meant that huge financial resources were now free
to build more of the lesser warship classifications. As a
result there developed a "balanced fleet" concept in which
each navy's fleet strength would be tailormade to meet its
respective missions and strategies.
Japan also gained an enormous advantage in America's
concession not to fortify its Pacific Ocean territories. The
price of this agreement, however, was the dissolution of
Japan's deeply cherished Alliance with Great Britain and, in
Japanese eyes, a measure of international respect, prestige,
and acceptance as a formidable world power. Nevertheless,
Japan now dominated the western Pacific region with little
fear of European or American interference. In effect, the
United States agreed to a shift in the regional balance of
power since, without fortified naval bases in the Philippines
or Guam, the U.S. Navy would be hard pressed to cross the
Pacific Ocean and defeat Japan's waiting battleline.
Finally, after the conference ended, the U.S. Congress
exhibited reluctance to allocate funds needed to expand the
fleet up to treaty limits. This tacit abdication by the
United States of its negotiated position handed Japan the
materiel advantages previously denied at the bargaining table.
One writer has observed that a major weakness of the
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Washington Naval Conference was the absence of any enforce-
20
sent provisions. Not only was compliance based on an
honor system impossible to verify, but the naval restrictions
limited virtually all unilateral movements to enforce the
agreements. Such a predicament could only foster suspicion
and ill will should any of the signatories even give the
appearance of violating any or all of the agreements.
During the immediate post-conference period, relations
between the United States and Japan were further strained in
a number of ways. One area of friction involved the economic
competition for China's vast potential consumer market. This
economic rivalry originated in Japan's and America's economic
expansion during the lucrative World War I years. Japan
desperately needed China's raw materials and consumer market
for its finished goods. Not only were these needed in order
to sustain its own economic growth, but also in order to
avoid the social problems associated with mass unemployment.
The United States likewise desired Chinese trade as an outlet
21
for its own manufactured goods.
Racial prejudice against Orientals in the western United
States provided another source of increasing tensions. In
1922 and 1923, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings
which denied Japanese immigrants the legal right to become
naturalized citizens and defined them as racially nonwhite
people. These decisions outraged popular sentiment in Japan
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and effectively nullified the good will which had been created
by the outpouring of American aid following the disastrous
1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. To add insult to injury, in
1924 the Congress passed the Johnson Immigration Act dramat-
ically reducing the number of Orientals allowed into the
country.
The anti-Oriental legislation created a war scare in the
Far East in 1924 and 1925. The U.S. Navy responded in 1925
with the first of a series of annual naval maneuvers in the
Pacific, a not-so-veiled threat directed against Japan.
Certainly the Japanese concluded as much, and, as a result,
became the first of the Washington signatories to exploit
the treaty loopholes by increasing construction of non-
capital warships. Tension increased even more as a result
of Washington's and Tokyo's inability to verify each other's
compliance with the non-fortification clauses of the Four-
Power Treaty. One scholar of the interwar treaty period
noted that during the 1920s "the military services in both
Japan and America were pursuing legitimate and necessary
improvements in their war-fighting capabilities in case the
treaty failed." Consequently there was chronic "tension
between the arms limitation regime and the function of the
military establishments [which] was a constantly destabili-
22
zing dilemma in Japanese-American relations."
One further cause of the deteriorating relations be-
-20-
tween Japan and the U.S. was a serious economic dislocation
in Japan as a result of an anti-Japanese economic boycott in
China during the mid-1920s which shifted the balance of
political power away from moderates and towards radical,
anti-treaty elements. In addition, the standard of living
declined in rural Japan, a region from which the Army officer
corps largely came, and this drove a wedge between them and
moderate politicians. As the domestic economy continued to
decline, unemployment rose dramatically and created a climate
of social unrest directed against the government's ineffec-
tive policies. Finally, in the late 1920s the Great Depres-
sion began to impose its terrible burden upon the Japanese
people as it did around the world. As Western governments
quickly built walls of protective tariffs around their own
economies, the economy in Japan—a nation heavily dependent
upon trade for survival—tumbled even more. As an indirect
consequence of the Depression, the Japanese increased their
construction of secondary naval shipping. On the one hand,
the government desired to save the shipbuilding industry and
its supporting trades from decimation caused by a complete
building halt. On the other hand, an enlargement in the
cruiser and submarine fleets were considered necessary to
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offset the reduced size of the main battlefleet.
All the Washington Naval Conference signatories recog-
nized the need to bring secondary warships into the arms
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limitation process because they had failed to agree on their
reduction, and as a result, a cruiser building race between
Japan and Great Britain began in the post-conference period.
The U.S. did not participate in this buildup in its early
stages because of congressional reluctance to appropriate
money for new ship construction. On 19 February 1927,
President Calvin Coolidge invited the participants of the
Washington Naval Conference to meet in Geneva, Switzerland
and discuss limiting non-capital shipping, with special
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attention given to both heavy and light cruiser classes.
Italy declined to attend the conference because of its tense
relations with France; and France refused to come unless the
agenda included a comprehensive discussion of land and air
forces as well as naval disarmament. Only the "big three"
—
Great Britain, the U.S., and Japan—came to Geneva.
The Geneva Naval Conference began on 20 June 1927.
Naval professionals were heavily represented in their respec-
tive delegations. Almost immediately Britain and the U.S.
began feuding over the guestion of reducing the size of
cruiser fleets, a dispute, giving Japan the opportunity to
act as peacemaker by mediating the quarrel. This Anglo-
American squabble contributed to the conference's overall
failure to reach any agreement limiting secondary warships.
Since the Geneva Naval Conference concentrated almost
exclusively upon heavy and light cruisers, little discussion
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ever took place on other warship classes, such as submarines.
The failure to hold significant discussion may have been the
result of the fact that too many naval officers served in the
delicate role of diplomats. International diplomacy is
founded upon an atmosphere of give-and-take, and naval offi-
cers, by reason of their training and experience, were not
always mindful of the need for compromise. Although the
participants exhibited a marked unwillingness to compromise
their national interests, one historian has suggested that
the main problem at Geneva was a failure to address the
political problems which made a disarmament agreement impos-
sible to reach: "Armament is merely an instrument of foreign
policy, and any attempt to regulate weapons independent of
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their reason for existing was doomed from the start."
A third major naval arms limitation meeting opened in
London on 21 January 1930. Its goal was to continue the
reduction process begun in Washington in 1921-22 by regulat-
ing smaller warship classes and by discussing an extension
of the construction freeze on capital ships. Those repre-
sented in London included the five original Washington
signatories as well as the dominions of the British Empire:
Australia, Canada, India, the Irish Free State, New Zealand,
and the Union of South Africa.
As at Geneva in 1927, conferees were mainly interested
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in the cruiser. The United States wanted to include cruisers
in the 10:6 ratio agreed to at Washington. Japan opposed
this favoring instead a 10:7 ratio which was more suitable to
its defense needs and its naval superiority in the Pacific.
Japan's insistence upon a 70% ratio was founded upon a
common strategic perception during the interwar period to
the effect that any fleet crossing an ocean in order to
engage any enemy fleet required a minimum strength of 70% of
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that of its adversary. The U.S.'s David A. Reed and Japan's
Tsuneo Matsudaira, in quiet discussions, reached a compromise
solution whereby -Japan would accept the 10:6 ratio provided
the United States did not build beyond the 10:7 ratio before
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the next scheduled disarmament conference in 1936.
The London Naval Conference also devoted much time to
the issue of submarines. At the earlier Washington conference
the United States had opposed the British move to abolish this
warship altogether. But eight years later the American
attitude had changed sharply, Washington supported a renewed
British effort to outlaw the submarine and there were two
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major reasons for this reversal. First, the American
public considered submarine warfare barbaric, a legacy of
wartime propaganda. Second, many Navy officers believed a
reduction in the submarine fleets of other nations, partic-
ularly Japan's, would translate into greater naval strength
in the American battleline. Furthermore, the Navy became
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increasingly alarmed at the submarine construction schedules
of the Washington signatories. During the period 1922-29,
France built 42 submarines, Japan 35, Italy 28, Britain 14,
and the U.S. only three. To a lesser extent, submarine
opponents argued that modern boats were becoming increasingly
expensive to build and their presence necessitated additional
funding for anti-submarine weaponry and ships at a tine of
budgetary restraint.
Accordingly, after preliminary discussions with both
Britain and Japan, the chairman of the U.S. delegation and
Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, submitted comprehensive
proposals to the conference. In terms of submarine warships,
Stimson stated that should the conference ultimately decide
to retain this category, both the United States and Great
Britain should be permitted a total of 60,000 tons while
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Japan should keep 40,000 tons. Furthermore, existing sub-
marines and those already under construction would be allow-
ed provided their inclusion did not exceed the suggested
maximum tonnage. Stimson also proposed a moratorium on
submarine building until 31 December 1936. In closing his
remarks, the Secretary of State suggested that submarines
be required to function under the same rules of warfare with
regard to hostile merchant vessels as those governing sur-
face warships.
A few days later, Stimson further clarified the U.S.
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stance on submarines in a telegram to the State Department.
While the United States favored an acceptance of the lowest
possible tonnage allowances, the government would agree to
outright abolition provided all five maritime powers adopted
such a position. Once again Stimson emphasized that subma-
rine operations against merchant shipping should be regulat-
ed by the accepted rules of engagement applied to surface
warships, with utmost importance being given to the safety
of passengers and crew.
Discussion of submarines continued until mid-March when
the delegates agreed to raise the individual boat tonnage
from 1,800 tons to a maximum of 2,000 tons. At the same
time, the U.S. accepted Japan's argument for additional
tonnage by increasing its submarine fleet to 52,700 tons, or
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parity with the United States.
On 10 April 1930 Stimson sent a telegram to the Acting
Secretary of State in which he notified the U.S. Government
that an agreement between the United States, Japan, and
Britain had been reached on a "skeleton of proposed five-
power treaty." Part II of this tentative accord addressed
the issue of defining "the rules of international law as to
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the use of submarines." Stimson noted that Japan had
abandoned attempts to shift tonnage allowances from destroyers
to submarines. Instead, the Japanese accepted submarine
parity with the United States and Britain at 52,700 tons.
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However exceptions were permitted the Japanese in the form of
early scrapping and replacement of some warships, including
submarines, in order to keep the domestic shipyards active.
This provision stipulated that the final limitation tonnage
figures were not to be exceeded.
The London Naval Conference ended on 22 April with the
signing of the treaty document by all participants. It would
remain in force until the last day of 1936. The treaty also
specified that a new conference should begin in 1935 to
replace the treaty before it expired. However the agreement
reached in London did not enjoy universal popularity.
Japan's support of the treaty created a domestic political
crisis in which moderate politicians and naval leaders
began losing dominance of and influence over government
policy to more militant politicized elements in the military.
In a vain effort to beat back this assault, the moderates
made concessions to the radicals through pledges to develop
air power for use in the Mandated Islands in order to offset
the smaller submarine force decreed by the treaty and to
intensify training aboard treaty-regulated warships in order
to Increase the fighting quality of both crews and vessels.
Among U.S. Navy officers, there was dislike for the
treaty because it lowered the fleet's capability to project
offensive power across the Pacific and to defeat the Japanese
in the event of war. But it must be noted that one positive
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outcome of the London treaty which had far-reaching results
was in the reduction of the post-World War 1 Anglo-American
naval rivalry and the shaping of a foundation for future
cooperation.
The interwar attempt to limit the pressures of a
dangerous naval arms race began to fall apart in the years
after 1930. Many factors contributed to this deterioration.
Economically, the need to reduce government expenditures on
naval arms was no longer the opporessive fiscal threat that
it had been in the early 1920s. In fact, as a result of the
worldwide depression, governments soon realized that arms
purchases stimulated employment which in turn relieved
potentially explosive domestic outbursts. Furthermore, the
technology of war itself had changed the possibilities avail-
able to defense strategists. Throughout the 1930s, two
weapons platforms—the airplane and the submarine—continued
by trial and error, success and failure, the evolutionary
process of development and acquired an increasing standard
of mechanical reliability and technological feasibility for
fulfilling the dreams of strategic prophets. In so doing
the airplane and the submarine threatened to undermine and
even abolish the traditional foundation of naval power: the
capital ship. Finally, Japanese-American relations became
increasingly strained during the 1930s as a result of the
rise of a militaristic and belligerent government in Japan.
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Japanese aggression in Manchuria (1931), war with China (1937),
and hostilities with the Soviet Union (1938-39) poisoned
bilateral relations and encouraged new U.S. naval construction
up to treaty limits.
The deathblow to the naval arms limitation process came
on 19 December 1934 when Japan denounced the Washington and
London naval treaties and gave the required two years notice
of abrogation. As provided by the Washington treaty, all
signatories would gather together within one year to hammer
out a new treaty system. On 9 December 1935, the eleven
delegations assembled once again in London for the Second
London Naval Conference, the principal focus of which was
Japan's desire for parity in all naval categories with both
the United States and Britain. The English-speaking powers
refused Japan's demand for equality and on 15 January 1936,
the Japanese delegation withdrew from the conference.
Although a new treaty agreement was reached in London
and signed on 25 March 1936, the document itself was meaning-
less in the absence of a Japanese signature. The interwar
naval limitation period was over. Later in the year, however,
a move was made to renew the spirit of the treaty period and
its attempt to civilize the nature of submarine warfare. The
clauses of the 1930 London treaty prohibiting unrestricted
submarine warfare against commercial shipping were made into
a special Protocol shortly before the treaty's expiration.
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The Protocol was ratified by the governments of Great Britain,
the United States, Japan, France, and Italy and acceded to by
Germany and the Soviet Union. By the outbreak of war in
1939, more than 40 nations had either officially sanctioned
or informally subscribed to the Protocol. Looking back on
this attempt to soften the destructive magnitude of naval
warfare through a common acknowledgement of "rules" by which
it could be fought, one eminent naval historian commented:
"the value of those signatures may be regarded as justifica-
tion for cynicism about attempts to 'humanize' war."
Cynicism aside, whether justified by later events or
not, the major naval powers of the interwar period attempted
to address the awesome reality that modern warfare had
acquired a brutal life of its own and a voracious appetite
for consuming the treasuries, resources, and populations of
the combatants. The diplomats attempted to control the
beast, while simultaneously pushing forward their national
interests and ambitions, by regulating the status quo around
a conference table. The fact that they eventually proved
unsuccessful was due more to the changing nature of people
in positions of power and events which had originally
supported the arms limitation process. However during the
same period, naval professionals continued to develop and
evaluate those aspects of naval power not specifically
addressed at the conference table. Coupled with technolog-
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ical improvements was the need to formulate practical, win-
ning strategies for their employment should diplomacy give
way to combat as the arbiter of international relations. In
this process, the submarine continued to make its presence
felt.
-31-
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SUBMARINE WARFARE AND THE
INTERWAR STRATEGY DEBATE
While the politicians and their military advisers spent
the interwar period haggling with one another at the series
of naval limitations and disarmament conferences, other
members of the naval profession debated issues of Pacific
Ocean grand strategy and what types of warships would be
needed for military victory in the event war broke out be-
tween the United States and Japan. The question of submarine
development was influenced during the interwar period by the
limits of contemporary technological understanding and
invention. As is frequently the case in modern warfare, the
theories of strategic thinkers sometimes outdistanced the
existing level of technological capability and thus unfairly
discredited a weapons system before it has been developed
into maturity. As the weaknesses of the Washington Naval
Conference became apparent to the United States and Japan,
a seemingly inevitable drift towards military confrontation
and war encouraged naval strategic thought towards winning
such a conflict and the development and acquisition of war-
ships able to fulfill the strategists' expectations.
The Imperial Japanese Navy began considering the possi-
bility of war with the United States as early as 1907. In
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that year, discussions on imperial defense policy and a
principle of operations concluded that in any future fight
with America the Navy would assume the strategic defensive
and entice the enemy fleet across the Pacific Ocean where it
would be destroyed in a climactic battle with the Japanese
Fleet.
1 This initial policy was revised on three occasions
in order to meet the changing requirements of international
relations and military technology: near the end of World
War I, immediately following the Washington Naval Conference
in 1922, and in 1936 as the capital ship construction mora-
torium approached expiration.
With the first revision in 1917, Japan's basic naval
strategy against the U.S. Fleet was stated more clearly in
its "Procedure of Operation":
In the outset of a war, the Navy will gain control
over the United States fleet in the Orient, and at
the same time destroy the enemy's naval bases in
Luzon and Guam in co-operation with the Array. The
Navy will try to reduce gradually the force of the
enemy fleet units in transit and destroy them to-
tally with our capital fleet units, seizing an
opportunity when the main body of the enemy fleet
proceeds toward the Orient.
In essence, Japanese naval strategists assumed the U.S. would
attack Japan directly with its own battleline early in any
future conflict. This assumption suggested using selected
naval units to intercept the American fleet as it crossed
the vast Pacific and weaken its fighting strength by attri-
tion prior to engaging the Imperial Navy's battleline some-
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where in the western Pacific.
The first priority of the "interception operational
procedure" was the destruction of the American Asiatic Fleet
and its supporting bases at Guam and the Philippines early
in the war. At the same time, Japan's submarine fleet would
be dispatched to intercept and shadow the U.S. fleet on its
trans-Pacific voyage and reduce its fighting power by re-
peated attacks. Japan's battle plan was enhanced by the
geographical fact that the most direct route the Americans
could take to relieve enemy pressure against Guam and the
Philippines lay through the Japanese-controlled Mandated
Islands. Once within range, it would be subjected to contin-
uous and coordinated assaults by both Japanese land-based and
carrier-based naval aircraft. Finally, the Japanese war
scenario called for fast surface elements of the Combined
Fleet to add their weight to the steady destruction of the
U.S. Fleet in a night attack utilizing naval gunfire and
torpedoes. This clash would be followed the next morning
by the coup de grace administered by the now concentrated
and untouched Japanese battleline.
Attendant to the debate over the proper naval strategy
Following World War I the League of Nations granted
Japan the mandate over former German insular possessions in
the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. These were the
Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline islands groups.
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Japan should employ against the United States was the issue
of what kind of fleet would be needed to successfully imple-
ment that strategy. This question was not unreasonable since
it is much like the hand inside of and giving substance to a
glove. Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue expressed his views on
a future Japan-U.S. conflict in his "Modern Military Pro-
curement Planning." Admiral Inoue reasoned that Japan would
never be able to defeat the United States since the latter *s
territory could not be entirely occupied nor could its capi-
tal city be captured by Imperial forces. Moreover, America's
operational military forces could not be completely destroyed
if they chose to refuse battle; and they were supported by a
vast population and industrial infrastructure located on
territory unreachable to Japan. Even an attempt to impose a
naval blockade against the United States was impossible
because of the abundant natural resources contained within
the nation's borders, the length and remoteness from Japan
of the enemy's coastlines, and the obvious fact that America
was both a continental as well as a naval power and could
therefore acquire its needs from throughout the Western
Hemisphere.
Inoue reversed his argument to show that it did not
necessarily apply to Japan. On the contrary, the U.S. was
able to conquer all Japanese territory, including the
national capital Tokyo. The U.S. could destory Japan's
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operational military forces and impose an effective maritime
blockade against the Japanese Home Islands. Furthermore, the
Americans were technologically capable of sustaining such a
naval blockade even at the end of a lengthy trans-Pacific
supplyline. Admiral Inoue warned his countrymen that a
"great revolution in naval strategy" had taken place with the
development of the airplane and submarine which dramatically
changed the face of naval warfare.
Accordingly, Inoue offered some predictions as to the
nature of a future war between Japan and the U.S., predic-
tions which later proved to be unnervingly accurate. First,
the Japanese admiral saw American submarines and aircraft
endangering Japan's maritime lifeline: "The securing of sea
routes will be one of the most important operations in a war
between the United States and Japan." Instead of anticipating
a Mahanian battle between capital ships, Inoue saw a struggle
for control of Japan's island bases in the Mandates, the
Philippines, and throughout the Empire itself "the importance
of which is equal to that of the decisive battles between
fleets of capital ships in the old days." Although Inoue
envisioned that Japan would quickly obtain regional hegemony
because of its possession of the Pacific insular land masses,
he cautioned that "the meaning of control of the sea is not
as absolute in the days of the submarine as it was in the
old days." He advised that a more effective use for Japan's
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submarines would be to employ them offensively against
American sea lines of communication in the Western Hemisphere
rather than in locating, shadowing, and attacking the west-
ward-bound enemy fleet. Presumably, Inoue based this last
argument upon two factors: his dim view of Japanese sub-
marine doctrine and its reliance on boats technologically
unable to keep up with the faster surface warships; and the
realization that the conventional wisdom was throwing Japan's
underwater force against American naval strength rather than
against the more vulnerable merchant marine.
Admiral Inoue concluded "Modern Military Procurement
Planning" with suggested recommendations on preparations the
Imperial Japanese Navy should make in anticipation of
hostilities with the United States. First and foremost,
Inoue considered it "absolutely necessary" that Japan protect
its sea routes by building the appropriate defensive naval
forces. Since Japan was particularly vulnerable in this
area and almost totally dependent upon sea-borne imports,
he warned against a flippant attitude. "The point we must
be very aware of is that we have had no experience in fight-
ing enemies with submarines in either, the Russo-Japanese War
or in the China Incident (1937-present) ; and since we have
had the good fortune never to have been attacked on the
communications routes. .
.
, we are likely to ignore the
4
problems involved should this come about." Consequently
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Inoue urged Japanese leaders to begin immediately organizing,
training, and building the necessary military and naval
components needed for a strategic—as opposed to tactical-
defense of the western Pacific against any intrusion by
enemy vessels. Such preparations could be met by a dominat-
ing air force, numerous submarine forces, convoy escorts,
and "powerful mobile sea task forces." In addition, Inoue
subscribed to the old adage "the best defense is a good
offense" and accordingly favored a ship-building program
emphasizing long-range, long-endurance submarines capable of
patrolling off the United States' West Coast thus striking
enemy sea transport at its source. Inoue believed Japan
should acquire a specialized amphibious assault infrastructure
able to quickly capture Pacific islands needed as bases for
supporting the strategic defense against American forces.
These insular possessions would be "of the highest impor-
tance for advancing and extending the range of our naval
aircraft while hindering the operations of enemy aircraft,
submarines, and naval ships."
Japanese submarine doctrine for war with the U.S.
originated with the Washington Naval Conference's limitation
of capital ship strength to 60% that of the Americans and
British. This apparent disparity in total strength, even
though Japan's entire naval force was concentrated in the
Pacific Ocean whereas the Americans and British were forced
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by geographic and political considerations to disperse their
fleets for broader coverage, fostered speculative thought
on ways and means to even the score in terms of aggregate
fighting power. In 1923-25, the commander of the First Sub-
marine Squadron, Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, conceived a
solution which he later perfected when he became Commander
in Chief of the Combined Fleet in 1933. Nobumasa's idea was
the "strategy of intercept!ve operations." In it, he pro-
posed that submarines be used to reduce overall American
Pacific naval strength by 30% through repeated attacks during
the long passage across the ocean. "A decisive surface
battle would then follow in or near Japan's home waters,
where the proximity of shore planes, the freshness of the
Combined Fleet, and the unparalleled Yamato spirit would
quickly put down the aggressive American ships, just as
6
Togo's fleet had annihilated the Russians at Tsushima."
Essentially the admiral's strategy of interceptive opera-
tions was a war of attrition requiring a large fleet of
7
big (for endurance and range), fast submarines.
Nobumasa recognized the value of numerous submarines
wearing down the American fleet during its long voyage, but
his thinking was still heavily influenced by the vision of
ships-of-the-line pounding away at one another with their
guns until one side emerged victorious. However during the
1930s technological improvements in weaponry gradually moved
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the location of the climactic naval battle further to the
east: ever increasing cruising ranges for such important
participants in the coining struggle such as aircraft and
naval shipping forced changes in the site of the decisive
battle. Originally anticipated in home waters, by 1934
Japanese strategists expected the battle to occur along a
line stretching between the Bonin and Marianas Islands.
By 1940, this imaginary line had been pushed further east-
8
ward into the Marshall Islands.
There were problems with Admiral Nobumasa's strategy.
Naval planners and strategists faced some tough questions
in the event the war did not evolve according to their
expectations. For example, would the United States Navy
hastily commit itself to an early, decisive naval engagement
or would it wait and build up its strength before risking
everything on one throw of the dice? Most chilling of all
was the question of Japan's response should the U.S.
decide to wage a protracted war of attrition in which the
greater American industrial capacity could be brought to
bear? Thoughtful Japanese leaders quickly recognized the
vital importance of an overwhelming victory early in any
future conflict with the United States.
American naval strategists also spent considerable time
debating what role the Navy would adopt in the event of
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hostilities with Japan. The battle plan that evolved was
known as War Plan Orange, "orange" being the codename for
Japan. Briefly, War Plan Orange envisioned the entire United
States Fleet crossing the Pacific Ocean and relieving the
expected sieges of naval bases at Guam and more importantly
at Manila in the Philippines. From its base in the Philip-
pines, the fleet would seek out and destroy the Japanese
fleet in a textbook rendition of Mahan's decisive battle
concept. However not everyone within the Navy was fully
committed to the basic outline of War Plan Orange.
By the late 1930s, War Plan Orange had come under heavy
criticism. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander in Chief,
Asiatic Fleet in 1937-38 proposed an alternative which
called for a war against the vulnerable Japanese economy by
destroying its supporting maritime communications. Yarnell's
idea was an adaptation of the German strategy used against
Britain during World War I, a strategy which nearly succeeded.
The advantage of guerre de course, the antithesis of Mahan-
ian doctrine, lay in its reduced emphasis upon committing
the entire U.S. fleet to a major battle early in a war with
Japan. In addition, such a strategy would be less costly
in terms of men and naval vessels damaged or destroyed since
the American target would be the relatively defenseless
merchant shipping rather than powerfully armed warships.
Admiral Yarnell's plan of economic warfare was given
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official blessing as an alternate to War Plan Orange in
January 1938 when the U.S. and Britain reached an understand-
ing on the division of defensive responsibilities should both
parties find themselves in a common war against Japan. In
such an event, the United States would defend the Western
Hemisphere while British forces would cover the Malay
Barrier and Indian Ocean; no Japanese commerce would be
9
allowed beyond these lines.
Throughout the interwar period of naval limitations,
one factor continued to destabilize Japan's ability to live
up to its diplomatic obligations. This was the internal
struggle for power and control within the Imperial Japanese
Navy's officer corps. The bureaucratic infighting centered
primarily around two factions : the Navy Ministry and the
Navy General Staff.
The Navy Ministry was largely an "administrative group"
responsible for the housekeeping details which included
budgetary matters, ship construction, weapons purchase,
naval personnel, relations with the Diet (Japan's legisla-
ture) and the cabinet, and broad naval policy matters. The
Navy General Staff or "command group" was limited to fleet
operations and war planning. Up until the 1920s, Ministry
officials held the superior position in terms of policy-
making, an advantage much resented by admirals within the
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General Staff. However, beginning in 1921 when Japan entered
the series of disarmament conferences with the West, the
internal struggle for control intensified into outright
bureaucratic warfare and the gradual ascendancy of the Navy
General Staff in importance and influence.
The catalyst was the Washington Naval Conference. Ad-
mirals within the Navy Ministry supported the treaty system
and a policy of getting along with the two other major naval
powers, Britain and the U.S. The Navy General Staff, led by
Vice Chief of Staff, Admiral Kanji Kato, was vehemently op-
posed to any restriction upon Japan's naval power. The con-
flict deepened after the London Naval Conference in 1930.
Supporters of the treaty system were labeled the "Treaty
Faction" while its opponents became known as the "Fleet
Faction". It is important to bear in mind that the conflict
focused around opposition to the politically moderate naval
leadership within the Ministry which was committed to the
arms limitation treaty system. It would be incorrect to
conclude that all treaty proponents wanted an institutional-
ization of Japan's naval inferiority in order to avoid war
with either the British or Americans. Instead, the Treaty
Faction wanted to postpone what many believed to be an
inevitable clash with the English-speaking naval powers until
such time as Japan's own strength had been built up to a
level of superiority able to decisively defeat its enemies.
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What they feared was the Fleet Faction's hot-headed behavior
would precipitate a war before Japan was militarily prepared.
A third group of naval officers emerged in the mid-1930s.
Their political affiliation was determined by individual
inclination and experience gained during assignments overseas
as "language officers, attaches, or assistant attaches."
These officers identified with the nations to which they had
been assigned, forming an "American (or Anglo-American)
faction" and the "German (later Axis) faction", further
agitating the Japanese political pot.
The United States Navy's development of the submarine as
a major warship was complicated throughout the interwar
12
period by a variety of factors. All too frequently the
extant technology simply did not match theoretical applica-
tions. Moreover, the Navy General Board placed greater
emphasis upon the development of naval alrpower at the ex-
pense of submarines beginning in 1921. In the bureaucratic
struggle, traditional acceptance of the Mahanian doctrine
of decisive battle between fleets and its attendant repudia-
tion of guerre de course as an effective naval strategy, in
effect pitted "battleship admirals" against "submarine
lieutenants." Finally, the American public disapproved of
submarine warfare, a political fact which slowed development
in spite of the military realities in the Pacific Ocean basin.
-4 7-
Despite the obstacles in its path, American submarine
design and development did continue in the years between the
two world wars. In essence the Navy required a submarine
capable of fulfilling the strategic requirements of War Plan
Orange. Although the defense of the Philippines was con-
sidered important, the general consensus among navy leaders
was that the American colony could not remain unconquered
until the fleet arrived to lift the siege, defeat the
Japanese fleet, and end the war. Consequently basing facil-
ities in the Philippines could not be depended upon to sup-
port the fleet either because they might be controlled by
enemy forces or damaged in the fight for their recapture.
This possibility required that all American warships, includ-
ing submarines, be capable of steaming great distances from
their home bases to wartime operational areas. Accordingly
submarine design characteristics required a long-range
endurance capability and a relatively high surface speed,
otherwise too much time would be spent in transit and not
at the assigned patrol station, and lengthy passages increas-
ed consumption of fuel and food stores further reducing
overall patrol time on station.
Likewise, Japan stressed long-range cruising ability in
its submarine designs since doctrine called for an offensive
14
use against an advancing enemy fleet in mid-ocean. The
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Imperial Navy adopted two World War I patterns for its under-
water fleet: a fast fleet boat of British design and a very
long-range German minelayer. Japanese officials did not em-
phasize development of medium and short-range designs since
these boats were primarily for coastal defense rather than
long-range interdiction, and they thought the smaller submarines
could be rapidly produced during mobilization.
During the later stages of the interwar period, new
strategic considerations appeared to further complicate
Japanese submarine strategy. These possibilities included a
wider application of the medium- and short-ranged submarines
as major offensive/defensive weapons by scattering them
throughout the Mandated Islands; islands through which the
U.S. fleet must sail to relieve the Philippines. Japan also
developed submarine capabilities as a refuelling point for
long-range seaplane bombers.
Two submarine types were designed to carry out high
speed operations at great distances: the cruiser submarine,
originally designated "J", later Type "A" and the fast fleet
submarine (originally "KD" but later renamed Type "B").
Imperial Japanese Navy submarine classifications (effec-
tive 1928):
(1) Type A: blue-water, "oceanic operations"; 3 months
endurance capability.
(2) Type B: "fleet Operations"; 2 months endurance.
(3) Type C: "restricted area operations"; Uj months
endurance.
(4) Type D: blue-water minelayer (proposed).
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Both of these designs merged together in 1936 in three
variations. The Type A submarine displaced 2,200 tons and
carried a single float plane. Secondary armament consisted
of a single 5.5-inch deck gun and the maximum cruising range
was 16,000 miles at 16 knots. The Type B submarine displaced
1,950 tons and carried a similar deck gun but with a maximum
cruising range of 14,000 miles at 16 knots. The Type C,
1,500 tons displacement, also had a range of 14,000 miles at
16 knots, however this vessel did not mount a deck gun nor
carry any aircraft. Instead, the Type C carried a manned
midget submarine. All three vessel types were designed to
maintain a 2 3-knot surface speed, a factor considered suf-
ficient to keep up with the surface fleet.
Although cruiser and fleet boats formed the backbone of
Japan's submarine fleet, the adoption of Admiral Suetsugu
Nobumasa's "strategy of interceptive operations" as policy
encouraged the development of a third class, one specifically
designed to ambush the American fleet in mid-ocean: the
midget submarine. Now Commander in Chief, Combine Fleet in
1933, Nobumasa sponsored a highly secret program to develop
the midget ambush submarine. However the idea for such a
submersible originated with Captain Kaneharu Kishimoto that
17
same year. Kishimoto hypothesized that small, high-speed
submarines were more likely to get closer to an enemy war-
ship undetected, thereby increasing the certainty of torpedo
-50-
hits. This possibility, Klshimoto believed, could give Japan
a decisive edge in reducing American naval power through
attrition.
The midget submarine program received invaluable support
when a member of the Imperial household, Admiral of the Fleet,
Prince Hiroyasu Fushimi ordered two prototypes built on his
authority as Chief of the Naval General Staff. Prince Fushimi
did impose one restriction on designers of the manned midget
submarine: there must be a reasonable chance for the crew's
survival. In other words, the tiny submarines were not
considered suicide weapons.
work began on the first two prototypes under the strict-
est secrecy at Kure's naval arsenal and dockyard in 19 34.
During the design and construction phases, the entire project
was euphamistically referred to as Metal Fitting, Type A.
When the midgets entered fleet service they were called
Target, Type A. Sea trials of the first two prototypes in
1934 recorded underwater speeds of 25 knots. The midget
program continued with two more prototypes built in 1936 and
two advanced models in 1938. These last two were favorably
received and subsequently ordered into production.
Other codename designations included: "Special Sub-
marine Boats" used during communications relating to the
Pearl Harbor attack, "A-Target," "H-Metal fittings," "Anti-
submarine bombing target," "Model T.B.," "Model B," and
Koryu (dragon with scales). 18
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Throughout the 1930s, the midget submarine program was
covered in layers of tight secrecy. The small submersible
was to be Japan's surprise weapon in the coming war with
America. The Admiralty requisitioned a small island
—
Ourazaki—twelve miles southeast of Kure in the Inland Sea
as the site for final assembly of the midgets as well as
crew training. At "Base P", the hulls and frames were brought
together from a private shipyard near Kure and assembled.
The final production model which Japan used throughout
the Pacific War was a two-man submarine weighing 46 tons.
The little boat's only armament was its two 18-inch torpedoes.
Propulsion was supplied by electric batteries capable of
producing a 24-knot burst of speed. The Admiralty production
plan called for 1,278 midget submarines to be built in five
classes, but only 438 vessels were ever built.
The 1930s was a decade of rapid naval expansion in
both the United States and Japan, particularly in the latter
half of the decade. Although appropriations were relatively
modest in the early stages, once the Washington and London
treaty restrictions expired on 31 December 1936 both sides
immediately began a rapid expansion of their building
programs, often in response to legislative authorizations
made by the other.
Japan authorized four Supplemental Building Programs
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19during the decade. All four placed special emphasis on
the expansion of the naval air arm. However the Third and
Fourth Supplemental Building Programs (authorized in March
1937 and 1939, respectively) invested heavily in the con-
struction of 95 new warships, 40 of which were submarines.
Among the goals of these programs was the desire to exceed
both the armament and maneuverability qualities of American
warships on a class-for-class basis. Each Japanese warship
was to be bigger and better qualitatively than its U.S.
counterpart. This characteristic was in part an attempt to
21
overcome American industrial production superiority. By
contrast, the United States launched 31 submarines during
the entire decade 1930-39. 22
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PACIFIC SUBMARINES AT WAR ;
DECEMBER 1941-AUGUST 1943
Early Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, the long simmer-
ing tense relations between Japan and the United States
boiled over into open warfare. The years of strategic
planning, debate, and preparation ended as Imperial Japan-
ese naval aircraft delivered a stunning defeat upon America's
Pacific Fleet at anchorage in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Now,
the unforgiving test of battle would either vindicate or
repudiate prewar concepts in doctrine, strategy, training,
ship design and construction. The long anticipated Pacific
War had at last come.
Rather that retell the story of Pacific submarine war-
fare during World War II, especially when there are so many
excellent histories readily available, I propose to examine
how both combatants employed their respective underwater
fleets, why they were so employed, and the impact these
decisions had upon the war in general.
A great deal of Pacific War literature exists which
discusses at length the glamorous and heroic battles between
surface warships, between aircraft carriers, as well as the
numerous amphibious "island-hopping" campaigns. What has
not received as much attention was the critical importance
of the struggle waged beneath the ocean's waves and its
overall contribution to the American victory and Japan's
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shattering defeat. Yet had the U.S.'s "Silent Service" not
suffered serious defects in tactical doctrine, strategic
targeting, and most importantly the lengthy torpedo problem,
the war against Japan might have ended as much as a year
sooner. Japan's situation was identical to that encountered
by Great Britain during both world wars: an island nation
completely dependent upon the importation of raw materials
and foodstuffs across highly vulnerable and sometimes quite
lengthy sea lines of communication. Likewise, the United
States adopted a similar strategic goal as that of Germany
in both conflicts: to sever the enemy's maritime lifelines.
However as the war progressed, the strategic relationship
between Japan and the U.S. reversed giving Japan an opportu-
nity to seriously retard American advances against the
Imperial Homeland by striking at the enemy's lengthening
supply lines, thereby creating remote possibilities for a
negotiated end to the war on favorable terms.
Thus the Pacific submarine war was a story of missed
and consequently lost opportunities for both combatants. On
the one hand, the United States suffered from incorrect pre-
war assumptions with regard to the nature of submarine war-
fare which in turn gave rise to Inappropriate tactical
doctrine. In addition, careful consideration was not given
to the potential advantages of singling out one important
segment of the enemy's seaborne trade—the petroleum tanker
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fleet—for systematic destruction. Moreover, Yankee subma-
riners endured 18 months of combat with a torpedo, the sub-
marine's main armament, which simply did not perform as
designed. Perhaps more than any of the other problems
mentioned above, it was the unreliable Mark XIV torpedo
which delayed the final victory. Had this weapon functioned
as intended, the effect would have sharply reduced the nega-
tive impact of the other two difficulties.
Japan, for its part, missed opportunities its submarine
service might have created because of inappropriate strategic
employment throughout the war. Instead of striking vigorous-
ly at the American merchant fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy
doctrine demanded misguided attacks against combatant war-
ships rather than the less glamorous but more vulnerable
merchant shipping. Japan also abandoned the offensive
striking power of the submarine fleet in an effort to resup-
ply isolated island garrisons. On the tactical level, the
Japanese submarine force was crippled throughout the war,
and suffered accordingly, from its poor radar technology.
Consequently, Japanese boats were placed at a murderous
disadvantage against radar-equipped U.S. warships and air-
craft whenever low visibility conditions were present.
In an effort to understand the magnitude of the Pacific
submarine war, a few statistical data will be helpful. The
United States submarine service entered World War II with
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111 boats in commission and another 73 under construction.
t
Of these, 51 were deployed in the Pacific Ocean: 29 vessels
assigned to the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and 22 boats
with the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. By V-J Day, 2 Sep-
tember 1945, the United States had lost 52 submarines, 48
of which "were lost either directly or indirectly as the
result of enemy action, or due to stranding on reefs during
3
combat operations." These 52 vessels represented 18% of
the approximately 290 submarines which saw combat during the
war. In all, 374 officers and 3,131 enlisted men died
aboard their submarines; approximately 6.24X of the total
4
American naval dead.
The Imperial Japanese Navy began the conflict with 65
submarines. By the end of nearly four years of naval war-
fare the underwater fleet had sustained battle losses of
6
130 or 131 boats.
American submarines inflicted enormous destruction upon
Japan's navy and merchant fleet during the Pacific War.
According to postwar records, of the 686 Japanese naval ves-
sels sunk: during World War II, 201 were lost as a result of
U.S. submarine attacks. In terms of tonnage destroyed, U.S.
submarines accounted for 540,192 tons or 27.4% of the
g
Imperial Japanese Navy's total losses. With respect to the
war against Japan's merchant marine, the figures are even
more dramatic. Japan went to war with 1,703 merchant vessels
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of 500 tons displacement and larger in its inventory. Of
these, 94 were petroleum tankers (570,000 tons) and the
remaining 1,609 were dry cargo/passenger shipping grossing
9
approximately six million tons. An additional 4.1 million
tons of civilian shipping were either captured, requisitioned,
10
or built during the war. Thus the Japanese merchant marine
had at its disposal approximately 10.1 million tons of
shipping to support the national war effort. However by
mid-August 1945, the U.S. submarine fleet alone had sunk
1,113 (4,779,902 tons) of the 2,346 (8,618,109 tons) merchant
ship losses, or 55.4% of the total tonnage. Indeed, until
the aerial mining campaign using B-29 Superfortresses began
in March-April 1945, Allied submarines accounted for nearly
11
60% of all merchant vessel sinkings. In terms of person-
nel losses, 76,000 Japanese seamen began the war and another
61,044 were added to the merchant fleet for a total of
137,044. By the time of the surrender, 108,000 seamen were
listed as either killed or missing-in-action, 67,000 by
12
submarine attack alone.
From these dry statistics one thing should be clearly
evident: Allied submarines—primarily American submarines-
played a decisive role in the destruction of Japan's naval
and merchant marine fleets. Puthermore, submarines contrib-
uted a far greater influence upon the overall war effort,
especially with regard to the commerce war against Japan's
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merchant shipping, than would be indicated by the numbers of
men and equipment, warships and national treasure invested in
the silent service. U.S. submarines sank 5,320,094 tons of
Japan's total vessel losses of 10,583,755 tons. In other
words, 50.2% of all Japanese marine losses in World War II
were the result of fatal encounters with American subma-
13
rines. While not intending to callously belittle the
supreme sacrifice of the 3,505 officers and men who gave
their lives, in terms of total U.S. Navy casualties in World
War II, the submariners' contribution was a relatively
"small" price to pay for the important benefits they gained.
It is most unfortunate to contemplate the fact that had
America's submarine crews been given a reliable torpedo and
early direction to concentrate against the enemy's maritime
lifelines, specifically Japan's small tanker fleet, the
war's "cost" might have been smaller still—for both sides.
The Imperial Japanese Empire went to war with the United
States in 1941 for a variety of economic and political
reasons. First and foremost among the economic factors was
14
the nation's critical need for oil. As a developing in-
dustrial economy oil was the life's blood upon which virtu-
ally everything depended. The need for a secure and stable
supply of oil guided Japan's initial military movements.
During the summer of 1941, Japan produced approximately
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10% of its own oil from natural crude and synthetic sources.
Another 10% was imported from the Dutch East Indies. The
remaining 80% came from the United States, but on 26 July
1941 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive
order following Japan's seizure of French Indochina "freezing"
all that nation's financial assets and in effect imposed an
oil embargo. This action was soon followed by similar re-
sponses in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Thus Japan
lost 90% of its oil supply with no alternative sources
readily available.
Japanese oil reserves in mid-1941 were about 58 million
barrels. From the imposition of the oil embargo and the
outbreak of open warfare, seven million barrels were con-
sumed; and in spite of domestic production and conservation
methods, the inevitable drain could not be stopped. Japan
needed oil and the Netherlands' East Indies islands of
Borneo, Java, and Sumatra offered the nearest tempting
supply. Together these three islands produced 65 million
barrels of oil in 1940, 60% of which were pumped from
Sumatran wells. In addition, Japanese technical expertise
and refinery capacity were both capable of utilizing these
oil reserves. However one serious weakness was present
even before the ravages of war would make it glaringly
apparent: Japan's tanker fleet was not large enough to move
sufficient quantities of crude oil from the fields to home-
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land refineries. Most prewar oil imports had traveled in
foreign bottoms. One military solution to this strategic
dilemma was to reduce the size of the problem by basing the
Combined Fleet closer to the oil fields and refuelling it
directly from local refineries and the wellheads, as was
eventually done in 1942-44. A related problem involved the
time it would take to restore the captured oil fields to
maximum production following the inevitable damage and de-
struction caused by battle and sabotage. In the meantime
the strategic reserves would have to be consumed further
depleting this emergency supply.
Although the oil embargo presented a very serious
threat to Japan's national economic well-being, other factors
soon appeared which also threatened not only the economy
but the nation's physical survival itself. Japan depended
heavily on the importation of raw materials such as iron
from Malaya and the Philippines and rubber, tin, bauxite,
manganese, coal, cobalt, graphite, lead, nickel, phosphate,
and potash from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Not only
were these raw materials vital to the production process
of an industrial economy, they also had important military
applications. Without these supplies, Japan's economy would
soon falter and the nation's ability to project and sustain
military power would quickly weaken. Furthermore, both
industrial economies and military organizations function on
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the basis of human labor, and Japan was not self-sufficient
in feeding its people. One-fifth of the rice and wheat,
almost all sugar, and two-thirds of the soybeans which Japan
consumed were imported. In short, the 1941 embargo threat-
15
ened Japan with starvation.
Politically, Japan's seizure of the resources-rich
Dutch East Indies was expected to provoke a U.S. military
16
response. Too much American prestige and credibility were
at stake. A quick glance at a map of the Pacific disclosed
an ominous truth: the U.S.-owned Philippines represented
an immediate threat to Japan's commercial and military
communications by providing a base of operations for choking
Japan's route to the Southern Resources Areas. Naval
strategists pondering this possibility were also forced to
include in their considerations the threat potential of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet in distant Hawaii as the only other naval
force able to quickly respond to any movement south.
Besides, it would be illogical to attack an American colony
(the Philippines) without striking directly at the more
formidable naval threat in Hawaii.
Accordingly the characteristics ,of speed and surprise
became very important elements in Japan's bid for secure
sources of raw materials. On the one hand, speed insured
the swift capture of geographic areas rich in natural
resources before the economic infrastructure could be sabo-
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taged or destroyed and to alleviate the rapid depletion of
the nation's strategic reserves. Surprise was important as
the principal means of neutralising potential sources of
counterattack:. In other words, Japan's industrial weakness
and high dependency upon maritime Imports, relative to that
of the United States, necessitated a short war and a quick
victory. Japan could not afford a long war of attrition.
Therefore economic, military, and political necessities
encouraged Japan to strike simultaneously at U.S. military
forces as well as vital economic objectives. The first
because of its potential military threat and the latter in
order to capture the natural resources and associated infra-
structure relatively undamaged. Unfortunately, to accomplish
this dual task Japan had to spread its own military and
naval forces thinly across the projected theater of war;
there simply were not enough military or naval units and
transport capacity available to support concurrent operations
everywhere.
Japanese submarine strategy before the outbreak of
18
hostilities envisioned two roles for the silent service.
During Phase I, the Sixth Fleet would support the "blitz-
krieg" strike to secure the Important Southern Resources
Areas of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the Dutch East
Japan's Submarine Force Organisation
-65-
Indies by operating with surface fleet units either directly
or indirectly as scouting vessels. Upon completion of Phase I,
the Sixth Fleet would begin Phase II operations in which a
mobile ocean defense perimeter would be constructed utilising
Japan's central Pacific insular possessions as anchor points.
The purpose of this mobile defense perimeter was to blunt
and defeat the anticipated American counterthrust.
The Pearl Harbor operation was designed to destroy U.S.
naval power in the Pacific Ocean thereby gaining valuable
time in which Japan could capture and consolidate its econo-
mic objectives and establish a defense perimeter before a
19
rebuilt American fleet could challenge its conquests. One
consideration influencing the decision to launch a surprise
attack against the Pacific Fleet was the lack of fortifica-
tions in the Japanese-controlled Mandated Islands. Basic
prewar planning by both sides envisioned America's Pacific
Fleet crossing the ocean and linking up with the Asiatic
Fleet in the Philippines. This united force would then seek
out and engage the Japanese battleline in a decisive battle
somewhere in the western Pacific. The most direct route from
Hawaii to the Philippines cut through the central Pacific
Mandated Islands. Since operational strategy called for the
reduction by attrition of enemy naval strength prior to the
epic battle, and since the Mandates were not as heavily
fortified as generally believe in the West, Japanese strate-
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gists considered it necessary and advantageous to eliminate
altogether, or at least seriously weaken, the Pacific Fleet
as early in the war as possible by a surprise assault against
20
the Hawaii anchorage.
Because Japan had the advantage of beginning hostilities,
naval planners had the opportunity of pre-positioning subma-
rine forces in accordance with the doctrine of directly
supporting fleet operations. Accordingly nine medium-range,
RO-class submarines were deployed in the Marshall and Caroline
islands and 18 boats accompanied the Southern Force attacking
Southeast Asia and the Philippines. But the schwerpunkt or
main effort was with the Pearl Harbor Strike Force where
30 long-range, I-class submarines operated as a principal
component of the battle plan. A further five boats remained
in home waters for training and maintenance.
The 30 fleet submarines assigned to assist Admiral
Chuichi Nagumo's Carrier Striking Force were divided into
22
three groups. The General Reconnaissance Element, consist-
ing of two submarines, were ordered to scout the Pacific
Fleet's alternate anchorages at Samoa and the Aleutians.
The Reconnaissance Element, three boats under the command of
Captian Kijiro Imalrumi, provided an advance scouting screen
for the aircraft carriers throughout the long voyage across
the remote north Pacific. The third group, the Special
Naval Attack Unit was sub-divided into First, Second, and
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Third Submarine Flotillas. Admiral Tsutorou Sato's four boats
of the First Flotilla patrolled the area north of the Hawai-
ian Islands. This group was later joined by the three boats
of the Reconnaissance Element. The Second Flotilla's seven
submarines, under the direction of Rear Admiral Shigeaki
Yarazaki deployed to the waters east of Pearl Harbor. Both
of these groups sailed within hours of each other from their
home base of Yokosuka, the great naval base south of Yoko-
hama. The Third Submarine Flotilla's nine vessels sortied
from Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands under the command of
Rear Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa for its patrol area south of
Oahu. The Third Flotilla was later joined by Captain Hanku
Sasaki's Special Attack Unit of five fleet submarines special-
ly modified to carry one midget submarine each.
The mission of the three submarine flotillas of the
Special Naval Attack Unit was to sink those American warships
escaping the aerial attack on their Pearl Harbor anchorage.
The five midget submarines of the Special Attack Unit were to
add their weight to the confusion of battle by penetrating
the harbor's defenses and attacking the fleet as it was
bombed and torpedoed by Nagumo's naval aircraft. What is
not generally understood in the United States, primarily
because of the success of the aerial assault, was that many
Japanese naval officers regarded the submarine operation as
the decisive factor in the forthcoming battle. These officers
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believed the two-pronged attack would see the aircraft chas-
ing frightened crews and their ships out of the protective
harbor and into the periscope crosshairs of the waiting
Sixth Fleet. Unfortunately the highly regarded submarine
effort proved to be a dismal failure. Of the five two-man
midget submarines, two were sunk attempting to enter the
harbor, two were sunk inside without inflicting any major
damage, and one was captured after it ran aground. Not one
of the 28 fleet submarines lurking around the island success-
23
fully engaged or sank a U.S. warship.
One American naval writer intimately acquainted with
submarine warfare has suggested the relatively limited
participation by Japanese fleet submarines in this important
attack upon the enemy, particularly when such high expecta-
tions for success had been anticipated, created a loss-of-
face for the submarine service in the eyes of Naval High
Command authorities from which the Sixth Fleet never recover-
ed. Captain Beach argued that Pearl Harbor represented a
crippling turning point for Japan's submarine service. The
poor performance of the fleet submarines resulted in a
lowered priority for funding, equipment, and new construction.
Furthermore, Beach believed the slow paced installation of
radar aboard existing submarines was a direct result of the
Pearl Harbor embarrassment. Ultimately the loss-of-face may
have contributed to the Sixth Fleet's subsequent relegation
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to a mission of resupplying isolated Army and Navy garrisons;
in effect depriving Japan of an important offensive capability
at a critical time in the conflict.
Pearl Harbor proved to be a disaster for Japan as well
as the United States. In addition to disgracing the entire
Sixth Fleet before the high command, Japan's naval aircraft
failed to attack and destroy four critically Important stra-
tegic targets: the machine shops, the extensive oil tank
farms containing 4.5 million barrels of fuel oil, the absent
aircraft carriers, and the submarine base where nine fleet
submarines were moored at the time of the attack. Moreover,
the many I-class submarines on station outside Pearl Harbor
failed to give any information on local conditions and results
of the two air strikes along with any pertinent information
about American counterattack potential by the missing enemy
carriers. This failure may have contributed to Nagumo's
decision not to launch a third air attack since his own
reconnaissance aircraft were limited to a 250-mile radius
and the location of the enemy carriers was still unknown.
The potential for disaster was simply too great for Nagumo
to risk the priceless Japanese aircraft carriers so early
in the war.
Nagumo's understandable caution and concern for the
safety of his command resulted in his failure to complete
the mission of destroying American naval power in the
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Pacific Ocean thus gaining valuable time for Japan. Although
the first two air strikes went far in accomplishing Nagumo's
mission, the failure to order follow-up attacks against key
elements of the enemy's naval infrastructure ultimately
softened the effect of Japan's victory. However the American
aircraft carriers now formed the nucleus around which any
future surface fleet would be built and thus were too impor-
tant to risk unnecessarily and prematurely in a fleet-vs-
fleet engagement. The carriers were subsequently switched
to a role of hit-and-run attacks to keep the enemy off bal-
ance. Such "guerilla warfare" gave aircrews valuable combat
experience while sharpening tactics in this new dimension of
naval warfare. Consequently the only immediately available
strategic offensive capability remaining with the American
fleet was its submarines.
Japan's victory at Pearl Harbor forced a change in U.S.
doctrine on the proper role of the Navy's fleet submarines.
Like Japan, American strategists pictured the submarine
functioning primarily as a distant scout for the fleet. But
with the bulk of the U.S. battleline lying submerged beneath
the waters of Pearl Harbor, a new mission had to be rapidly
formulated. The realities of military defeat compelled
Navy strategists to reconsider the submarine as an anti-
commerce weapon rather than as a component of the fleet
itself. 26
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The decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare
against Japan was based on a realistic appraisal of the stra-
tegic situation facing the United States at the beginning of
2 7
1942. The redirection of submarine targeting doctrine
away from warships and towards merchant shipping was predi-
cated upon the recognition that modern warfare between in-
dustrialised nations is waged both militarily and economi-
cally. One way to neutralize the power of an enemy's sword
is to sever the arm holding it. In a military struggle, the
importance of economically disarming an enemy's ability to
wage war is vastly increased when the opponent is a maritime
power and heavily dependent upon sea-transported imports to
feed both the population and the war industries. It follows
then that the destruction of the merchant fleet carrying
needed foodstuffs and raw materials will as effectively dis-
rupt and destroy enemy war-making potential as surely as
the outright destruction of enemy arms on the battlefield.
Thus Japan's merchant marine represented a tempting target
for American submariners.
One other factor may have contributed to the decision
to wage guerre de course against Japan: key positions with-
in the Navy's chain of command were filled by submariners.
At the very top was Admiral Ernest Joseph King, Jr., Commander-
in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
King's naval career included commands of a division of inter-
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war S-boats and the New London, Connecticut submarine base
—
one of the three separate submarine commands in the U.S.
Navy. King also participated in the salvage operations of
two boats sunk in accidents in the 1920s. In addition,
King's staff in Washington was sprinkled with submariners:
Deputy Chief of Staff Richard Edwards, Operations Officer
Francis Stuart "Frog" Low, and Assistant Chief of Staff for
War Plans Charles Maynard "Savvy" Cooke. Finally, the
newly arrived Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral
Chester William Nimitz, was also a submariner. Nimitz
brought with him to Hawaii actual wartime experience as a
submarine skipper and division commander as well as being
the interwar Navy's leading expert on submarine diesel
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engine technology.
America's "maru war" against Japan's commercial shipping
did not begin in earnest after the opening salvoes of the
Pacific War. With the strategic initiative clearly on the
side of the Combined Fleet, the U.S. Navy's first order of
business was to blunt and, if possible, deflect the probing
fingers of enemy advances. This immediate need to defeat
the opening "blitzkrieg" phase imposed different missions
on the two U.S. submarine fleets. Pacific Fleet submarines
spent the next several months probing Japanese defenses in
the central Pacific islands gathering information useful in
planning a counteroffensive to drive the enemy back. Other
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Pacific Fleet submarines gathered intelligence and attacked
enemy shipping in the waters off Japan's east coast. These
combat patrols by Pacific Fleet submarines provided indirect
assistance to the hard-pressed Asiatic Fleet defending the
Philippines and Malay Barrier by drawing away enemy warships
needed to guard against these incursions.
The military situation facing the Asiatic Fleet in the
Philippines was more immediate: stop the invasion of
Filipino territory. Accordingly, submarines left port with
hastily revised orders to concentrate their attacks against
enemy capital ships first, to be followed by loaded invasion
transports, light marine forces, and transports and supply
ships in ballast, that is, empty. Other restrictive commands
included emphasizing the need to bring both boat and crew
back alive and in a reusable condition as well as conserving
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torpedo expenditures. While these changes were necessary
from the perspective of headquarters, the net effect at sea
was to pit Asiatic Fleet boats against concentrated enemy
antisubmarine defenses in the shallow waters surrounding
invasion beachheads and increasing the mental strain upon
boat skippers attempting to follow conflicting orders which
demanded aggressive results while at the same time counsel-
ling cautious behavior.
To understand the debilitating effect of abandoning
prewar planning, it is necessary to look at the submarine
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defense plan for the Philippines. Twenty-three fleet sub-
marines and six short-range S-boats comprised the Asiatic
Fleet's underwater force on 7 December 1941, the largest
concentration of American submarines anywhere in the world.
Commanded by Captain John Wilkes, the submarine force was
to deploy one-third—approximately eight boats—of its
vessels to strike directly at Japanese communications at
sea and reconnoiter enemy bases. Another third would
establish a picket line about the island of Luzon and provide
early warning and defense against invasion. The remaining
third would be kept in reserve to strike the enemy's main
invasion force once it had been identified and located.
This battle plan, based on the strategic Rainbow 5 Plan,
depended heavily on several important assumptions. First,
it was assumed the Army Air Force would provide intelligence
on enemy ship movements which in turn would be used in
coordinating and directing submarine defenses. Furthermore,
the plan expected to use Manila Bay as the primary staging
area for Asiatic Fleet submarines during the hostilities and
supported by the fleet's three submarine tenders HOLLAND,
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OTUS, and CANOPUS.
Unfortunately the Philippines' defense plan was badly
impaired on 8 December 1941 when the critical "eyes of the
fleet" were almost completely blinded by Japanese naval
bombers, flying from bases on Formosa, successfully destroy-
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ed most of the Air Force's planes, including the priceless
B-17 bomber force. Two days later, the Japanese bombed
Manila Harbor and the Cavite Navy Yard, site of the U.S.
submarine base. The attack on Cavite killed 500 people and
severely damaged one submarine; but more importantly it
destroyed the submarine repair facilities, the torpedo
overhaul shop, 233 Mark XIV torpedoes in storage, and the
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low-frequency radio tower. Approximately 150 now precious
torpedoes were salvaged from Cavite's ruins. This destruc-
tion of the shore-based support facilities greatly increased
the strategic value of the three fleet submarine tenders.
Accordingly, on 11 December OTUS and HOLLAND sailed from
Manila Bay leaving CANOPUS behind to service the embattled
submarines. On Christmas Day, after less that 24 hours
warning, CANOPUS shifted to Mariveles when Manila was declared
an open city. At the same time, as many submarine spare
parts and surviving torpedoes as possible were removed to the
safety of Corregidor, an island fortress near the entrance
to Manila Bay. Until Corregidor surrendered, all visiting
submarines hauled out extra portions of spare parts and
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torpedoes.
The sudden hurried evacuation of U.S. installations in
Manila, together with the loss of the entire island of
Luzon, placed U.S. submarine defenses at a serious disadvan-
tage. On the strategic level, these defeats permitted Japan
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to continue the naval advance further south toward the oil
and mineral rich Dutch East Indies while at the same time
protecting the eastern flank of Army troops on the Asian
mainland. Of more immediate concern to Asiatic Fleet
submarines was the forced abandonment of badly needed torpe-
do stores and spare parts and the destruction, at General
Douglas McArthur's order, of all diesel fuel oil stocks in
the Manila area. This loss of fuel supplies contributed to
the inability of U.S. submarines to sustain operations from
the Philippines. Another factor encouraging an early with-
drawal quickly became evident once submarine operations were
moved to Corregidor and became the focus of daily and at
times quite heavy air attacks. On New Year's Eve, Wilkes
ordered his submarines to evacuate the Philippines and pro-
ceed to the Dutch naval base at Surabaja on the island of
Java. Almost immediately Wilkes was confronted with the
difficult decision of choosing which support personnel would
leave and who would have to remain behind and face capture.
Wilkes concluded each of his Immediately available ten sub-
marines would be able to carry 25 people to safety. The
selection was guided by the standard of valuable skills
needed in continuing the submarine war effort regardless of
34
the location of future bases.
Surabaja's unsuitability as a base of operations quickly
became apparent when Japanese troops captured airfields well
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within range of the city. Admiral Thomas C. Hart's plan to
defend the Malay Barrier depended on the positioning of sub-
marines off geographic choke points or areas were enemy
invasion convoys would gather together: Davao, Indochina,
Makassar Strait, and the Molucca Passage. Unfortunately
this plan required the concentration of all boats, now
scattered throughout the region. By the time they had been
gathered together the Japanese had already passed through
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these areas.
Surviving remnants of the Asiatic Fleet submarine force
made their "last stand" from hastily established bases at
Brisbane and Fremantle (port of Perth) on the east and west
coasts, respectively, of Australia. During the spring and
summer 1942, the southwest Pacific situation stabilized as
both sides consolidated their positions and rebuilt their
forces. Throughout this period, American submarines suffered
constraints as a result of the loss of the Philippines and
the shortages created by the rapid retreat to Australia.
One persistent problem which plagued the force was the fre-
quent interference in operational deployment by the theater
commander in chief, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur
diverted boats for special missions resupplying beseiged
U.S. and Filipino troops holding out on Bataan Peninsula
and Corregidor or guerrilla bands forming throughout the
archipelago. While MacArthur' s concern for the troops he
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left behind is commendable, the question must be asked whether
or not this was a proper diversion of the submarine force at
such a critical time. Captain Wilkes was himself undecided
on the issue: on the one hand, the surviving Asiatic Fleet
submarines were the principal offensive power remaining in
the region, and they were needed to defend the imperiled
Malay Barrier. After all, submarines were not designed to
carry sufficient quantities of cargo for the effective re-
supply of the Philippines. On the other hand, Wilkes real-
ized that many of the submarine force's support personnel
were members of the isolated Philippine garrison, and he
wanted to show them in a tangible way that they had not been
abandoned.
During this same period—spring and summer 1942—the
Pacific War's focus shifted away from the southwest region
to the waters surrounding Midway Island. Japan's desire to
capture this isolated American outpost was encouraged by a
variety of factors. First, Midway provided the enemy with
a strategically important forward refuelling point for both
surface warships and submarines. This advantage increased
the underwater fleet's ability to keep boats on patrol off
the Empire's east coast. Second, Midway could provide Japan
with a base from which long-range air attacks could be
launched against Hawaii. But the most immediate reason for
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conquering Midway was the possibility of luring the remaining
surface units of the Pacific Fleet into a battle in which they
might be sunk. Once eliminated, the balance of power would
swing decisively in Japan's direction and encourage the
Americans to accept a negotiated peace settlement. In any
case, a Japanese victory might open the door for a cease-fire
which would give Japan the time needed to consolidate and
absorb the conquered territories into the imperial system,
further strengthening its position in the event the fighting
resumed at a later date.
Both combatants approached the Midway battle intending
to use their respective submarines in important secondary
roles in accordance with their conservative prewar fleet
doctrines. Japan deployed approximately 31 submarines to
assist the Midway invasion either directly or indirectly.
Sixteen vessels were assigned to directly assist the Combined
Fleet. Ten boats were ordered to patrol northeast of the
island, while four submarines watched the direct route be-
tween Midway and Pearl Harbor. Their mission was to locate
the American fleet as it sortied from Hawaii and reduce its
strength by attrition. Unfortunately for Japan, all the
submarines arrived late on station and missed the Pacific
Fleet.
One peculiar characteristic of Japanese naval operations
during the Pacific War was the tendency to disperse naval
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units across vast distances and to attempt to coordinate
their separate activities in hope of deceiving and confusing
Allied strategists. The Midway operation was no exception.
Attempting to distract American attention away from the main
effort aisied at Midway, Japan's Sixth Fleet ordered six
X-class fleet submarines to reconnoiter the Aleutians in
late May, five more boats to attack the harbor at Sydney,
Australia, and an additional four vessels to strike the port
of Diego Suarez, Madagascar. Both raids against Sydney and
Diego Suarez were timed to take place on 31 May and included
the use of midget submarines. The Japanese believed the
similarity of these attacks to the one on Pearl Harbor would
mislead American commanders into thinking the main Japanese
carrier force was operating far from the Midway area. U.S.
acceptance of this ruse would increase the Combined Fleet's
chances of surprising the enemy at Midway. A further six
I-class submarines were diverted from normal patrols to
refuel seaplanes reconnoiterlng Pearl Harbor in search of
intelligence information on the disposition and strength of
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the Pacific Fleet. Thanks to American MAGIC intercepts,
however, all these feints were unable to deflect U.S. planning.
The United States deployed three separate submarine
groups to defend Midway. The first and largest group was
positioned in a fan-shaped arc to the southwest, west, north-
west, and north of the island at a distance of 150 to 200
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miles. Their mission was to defend the island from the in-
vasion force and to strike any capital shipping which wander-
ed into their patrol zones. The second force was deployed
between Midway and Hawaii as a precautionary measure in case
the Japanese actually intended to attack that vital Pacific
outpost. For good measure, the final submarine force patrol-
led north of Oahu in case the enemy managed to slip through
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the other defensive arrangements.
The overall submarine contribution to the epic battle
of Midway was largely a disappointment for both sides.
Japan's creative, but ineffective, scattering submarines
across the globe indicated once again its failure to grasp
the essence of submarine warfare against an industrialized
opponent. Both sides used their underwater fleets to form
picket defenses around the island in a prudent manner, how-
ever the frustrating results may be attributed to the spec-
tacular success of the carrier vs. carrier nature of the
battle. Had the advantages of airpower not been present and
had the Japanese submarines arrived on station at the proper
time, the very character and outcome of the battle may have
been different.
After Midway the war's center of gravity returned to
the southwest Pacific, when, in August 1942 U.S. Marines
assaulted the island of Guadalcanal. The establishment of an
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American beachhead on the island caught the Imperial Japanese
Navy by surprise and forced the cancellation of a submarine
offensive in the Indian Ocean and redirecting this two-
squadron force into the Solomons. Throughout the struggle
for control of Guadalcanal , Japanese naval forces held the
initiative by their choice of time and place in which to
attack the beachhead and nearby support shipping. The
Americans were placed in a difficult tactical position by
the lack of a safe anchorage within easy supporting distance
of the beachhead. As a result, the warships covering the
invasion force had to maintain a constant presence in the
open waters adjacent to the island, yet still remain close
enough to provide air and gunfire support for the Marines.
This dilemma gave Japanese submarines many opportunities to
strike at the cruising warships. An indication of the
potential rewards of this advantage and its implication for
the American offensive in the Solomons occured on 31 August
1942 when the carrier SARATOGA was hit by a single torpedo.
The damage was serious enough to send the unlucky vessel
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back to West Coast shipyards for repairs. Two weeks later
two other Japanese submarines encountered a heavily escorted
convoy of six transports loaded with badly needed reinforce-
ments for Guadalcanal. Following traditional naval doctrine,
the Japanese skippers attacked the escorts rather than the
strategically more valuable transports and successfully
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daraaged the new battleship NORTH CAROLINA, the carrier WASP,
and the destroyer O'BRIEN. Only NORTH CAROLINA lived to
fight another day, WASP sustained damage so severe that it
was later scuttled and O'BRIEN foundered on the journey
back to the U.S. for repairs. This episode is important be-
cause after mid-September, the United States Navy had only
one carrier and one battleship left in the Pacific. These
losses, added to those sustained in the deadly night surface
actions of the same period, posed a real threat of reversing
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the Midway victory.
American submarines during the campaign operated from
the base at Brisbane under the command of Captain Ralph W.
Christie. Christie ordered his skippers to avoid the sea
around Guadalcanal for fear of being attacked by friendly
forces before proper identification could be established.
Instead, radio intelligence intercepts indicated that the
enemy was using the islands of Palau and Truk as staging
areas for their Solomons operations. In addition, a con-
siderable amount of naval traffic was plying the waters
between these two islands and the forward bases at Kavieng
and Rabaul. Unfortunately, Christie chose not to concentrate
his available forces in the deeper waters of the Pacific
Ocean, preferring instead a deployment in the shallow waters
around the heavily defended harbors and naval bases. As a
result, the submarines had to remain submerged most of the
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time, thus sacrificing their greatest assets: mobility and
speed. The disposition of submarines was not entirely
Christie's choice but a reflection of Admiral King's target-
ing priority which emphasised major warships over the smaller
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classes.
During the Solomons campaign Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii
scrupulously watched the number of Christie's Brisbane
submarines available for service and made sure the complement
never dipped below 20 boats. Nimitz also influenced the
naval situation when he ordered his Pacific Fleet submarines
to make regular patrols in the Marshall Islands, paying
particular attention to the enemy naval bases at Truk and
Palau. He hoped these operations would draw enemy warships
away from the fight for the Solomons. However these central
Pacific patrols limited the number of boats available for
missions into the Japanese Home Islands and the East China
*4
Sea.
By mid-November 1942 the battle for Guadalcanal had
turned in favor of the United States and compelled an im-
portant decision upon the Japanese Naval High Command. Over
15,000 Japanese troops were fighting on the island and their
resupply became a critical matter. But the logistical effort
was becoming too costly in terms of men and surface shipping.
Accordingly, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in Tokyo decided on
16 November 1942 that henceforth only submarines would be
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assigned the task of resupplying the Guadalcanal defenders.
This operation, code-named MOGURA (Mole) and commanded by
Rear Admiral Hisao Mito, called for the submarines to load
food, clothing, munitions, and medicines at Buin on the
southern tip of the island of Bougainville and then proceed
to the western end of Guadalcanal for unloading. The schedule
called for one boat to arrive each day carrying two days
worth of provisions.
This redirection of the submarine effort did not sit
well with many submarine captains. In a meeting aboard the
Sixth Fleet's flagship KATORI, anchored in Truk Lagoon,
prior to the commencement of OPERATION MOGURA, the captains
expressed fierce and heated opposition to what they consider-
ed a misuse of their warships. The argument continued un-
resolved until silenced by Sixth Fleet Commander, Vice
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Admiral Teruhisa Komatsu's decision to go ahead as planned.
Sixteen submarines were assigned to OPERATION MOGURA.
Each boat was armed only with the torpedoes inserted into
the launching tubes. All other weaponry, including the deck
guns, as well as spare parts were removed to increase the
cargo capacity. Crews were required to subsist on minimal
rations during the voyage in order to create still more
storage space. One commander who participated in OPERATION
MOGURA reported that by February 1943 when the island was
evacuated, 28 successful runs had delivered 1,500 tons of
-86-
supplies to the beleagured garrison for the loss of two
submarines.
In early 1943 it was evident that the heroic effort to
sustain the imperial troops fighting on Guadalcanal was
falling short. Japanese submarines, cramped by U.S. stan-
dards, were simply not suited to carry the necessary cargo
in sufficient quantities to maintain the island's garrison.
Consequently the Naval High Command decided to withdraw the
starving remnants. Characteristic of Japanese military
planning, an elaborate ruse was created to distract U.S.
attention away from the evacuation. Four I-class submarines
were sent to the Aleutians while individual vessels bombarded
the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean and Port Gregory on
Australia's west coast and Canton Island in the central
Pacific. However U.S. intelligence soon uncovered the de-
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ception which were subsequently ignored.
The fight for control of Guadalcanal marked a turning
point in the Pacific War. After November 1942, Japan was
forced onto the strategic defensive in order to retain the
conquests already achieved. The Combined Fleet suffered
serious losses among its surface elements during the six-
month struggle. The surviving ships were withdrawn to the
Home Islands where they became the nucleus around which a
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second generation fleet would be built.
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There was one region of the Pacific War which never
became a major theater of operations even though the terri-
tories of both Japan and the United States came closer to-
gether at this point than anywhere else. This region was
in the the cold waters of the north Pacific, in particular
the Aleutian Islands off the southwest coast of Alaska and
stretching westward towards Japan's Kurile Islands. One
Japanese submarine commander attributed this neglect to the
region's harsh climate, which combined extreme temperatures,
rough seas, and a generally low level of visibility to make
normal maritime operations hazardous even in peacetime and
all but impossible during war. These difficulties were of
particular concern to submarines and other small warships
because of the affect harsh weather conditions had upon
their sailing and fighting characteristics. For example,
a surfaced submarine running at full speed in the normally
heavy seas of the north Pacific risked structural damage to
the bridge from the pounding waves. Even if submerged, the
kinetic energy released by the wave motion of stormy seas
created havoc among the crew as the narrow-beamed vessels
was tossed about. Hen standing watch as lookouts on the
bridge were unable to remain topside for long periods due to
the extremely low temperatures and biting winds. Throughout
a northern voyage the boat's crew suffered physical discom-
fort as the frigid waters turned the submarine into an
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icebox and condensed moisture on the inside of the hull which
adversely affected electrical systems. These problems could
be partially alleviated through special cold weather clothing
and equipment. However these distinctive items were much
bulkier than normal gear confronting Japanese submariners
with additional stowage problems aboard their cramped boats.
Furthermore, Japanese naval strategy envisioned the main
theater of warfare to be in the southern tropical seas and
therefore no allowances had been made for stockpiling an
adequate supply of cold weather clothing and equipment. In
other words, these badly needed items were frequently in
short supply or non-existent.
Japanese submarine activity in the north Pacific in-
creased in the spring of 1943 in response to the shelling
of army positions on the island of Attu at the western end
of the Aleutian chain, by an American surface force in April.
This attack was interpreted by Japanese strategists as
indicating an imminent counteroffensive aimed at driving
them from their foothold in the north. The Imperial Navy's
three submarines patrolling the area were reinforced by 13
additional boats, all commanded by Rear Admiral Takeo Konda
aboard his flagship HEIAN HARU anchored at Paramushiro in
the Kuriles. This strengthened force failed to prevent the
successful reconquest of Attu in May 1943 and thereafter was
relegated to the resupply and defense of Kiska. Writing
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after the war, Captain Zenji Orita, himself a submariner,
cited this episode as another example of how Japan wasted
approximately two-thirds of its available submarine warships
in defensive or resupply missions rather than deploying them
to strike at Allied surface traffic. He further noted this
concentration of submarines presented no immediate or aggres-
sive threat to Allied merchant shipping which supported the
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westward movement of Allied military forces.
In June, Japan's submarines began the clandestine
evacuation of army troops from their remaining positions in
the Aleutians. In the process, three boats were sunk while
three others were damaged. In all, Japan's Sixth Fleet
lost six submarines in operations around the Aleutian Islands
over a period of one year with no appreciable results justi-
fying these northern patrols. An additional five midget
boats were lost when the island of Kiska was abandoned.
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PACIFIC SUBMARINES AT WAR :
SEPTEMBER 1943 - AUGUST 1945
The second full year of the Pacific War—1943—was a
transition period for U.S. submarine doctrine away from its
emphasis upon sinking enemy warships in favor of a growing
intensification in commerce warfare, a process dubbed the
"maru war." This change took place primarily because the
Combined Fleet had been secretly withdrawn from battle for
retraining, refitting, and rebuilding following the mauling
it had sustained in 1942 at Midway and in the Solomons.
Equally important was the arrival in large numbers of new
fleet boats from U.S. shipyards dramatically increasing the
silent service's ability to carry the war in greater numbers
into Japanese shipping lanes. However the persistent prob-
lem of defective torpedoes continued to plague U.S. subma-
rines until the discovery and correction of technical dif-
ficulties transformed this weapon into a deadly killer.
The United States submarine service entered World War II
with two models of torpedo. The older coastal S-boats
were armed with the relatively reliable Mark X, while the
newer fleet boats carried the larger 'and more sophisticated
Mark XIV. S-boat skippers with the Asiatic Fleet quickly
discovered the tendency of their Mark X torpedoes to run
about four feet deeper than the preselected setting. A bit
of detective work and a few calculations indicated this
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defect was a result of the difference in weight between the
exercise warhead used during peacetime training and the
heavier, explosive warhead used against enemy ships. On
5 January 1942, the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance issued radio
instructions notifying Commander, Submarines Asiatic Fleet,
Captain John Wilkes, of the problem and suggesting correc-
tive measures. Unfortunately, the fleet boats did not
receive the same prompt attention from Bureau of Ordnance
2
when problems with the Mark xiv's performance soon appeared.
The 3,000 pound Mark XIV torpedo--23 feet long by 21
inches in diameter—was a steam-driven "fish" carrying 507
pounds of TNT in its warhead. During the war the amount of
explosive the warhead was increased to 668 pounds. The
Mark XIV operated at two speeds! 46 knots for a maximum
range of 4,500 yards or the seldom used 31.5 knots for
9,000 yards. It was detonated primarily by the super-secret
Mark VI magnetic exploder or, as a redundant precaution, a
conventional contact exploder. The 92-pound Mark VI was
located at the base of the torpedo warhead and designed to
explode when the firing pin in the warhead's "snout" was
propelled by a steel spring into a fulminate cap which burst
in turn detonating a "booster charge" and igniting the main
TNT supply. The critical feature in the Mark VI's operation
was its ability to detonate when the torpedo entered the
magnetic field surrounding the steel or iron hull of a
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modern ship. In other words, the magnetic detonator allowed
a less accurate shot as long as the torpedo passed within a
theoretical area surrounding the ship's hull where the
target's magnetic filed would activate the Marie VI mechanism.
This feature was most advantageous when the torpedo was set
to run beneath the ship's keel since an explosion there
contained three times the power of a contact explosion
against the target's side. The Mark XIV's smaller warhead
was therefore able to inflict greater damage from beneath
the keel than if it were to hit the target's side directly.
The Mark XIV torpedo and its Mark VI magnetic exploder
suffered from a variety of technological problems, each of
which successfully obscured a quick isolation, identification,
and repair of the other defects. Tracking down these
elusive difficulties proved to be a long and discouraging
process from submarine crews and their commanders. The first
identifiable problem was the torpedo's inclination to run
too deep beneath the target, thus missing the vessel's mag-
netic field entirely. Irate sub skippers returned from
patrols in early 1942 with numerous storys describing how
their "fish" passed harmlessly beneath enemy ships. These
complaints received a caustic reception from the Bureau of
Ordnance, which issued slanderous replies about the quality of
crew training and torpedo maintenance. It should be noted
that no serious field testing of the Mark XIV and Mark VI
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had ever been conducted by the Bureau of Ordnance during the
developmental stage because peacetime budgets did not permit
test firings either for experience or quality control due to
the high price tag of each torpedo: $10,000. The situation
did not begin to change until after the arrival of Captain
Charles A. Lock wood, Jr. to assume command of U.S. submarines
in Australia in May 1942. Promoted to rear admiral, Lock-
wood quickly launched his own investigation into the reasons
why so many submarine skippers were experienceing problems
with their torpedoes by personally meeting each returning
vessel and informally chatting with the boat's captain about
his patrol. Soon common characteristics, such as unbroken
air bubble wakes, began to appear which suggested the Mark XIV
was running beneath its targets. When contacted about this
accumulating evidence, the Bureau of Ordnance responded in
a hostile rebuke. According to Lockwood, his chief of
staff, Captain Jimmy Fife, came up with the idea of using a
fishing net to measure the running depth of randomly selected
torpedoes. Lockwood arranged a series of test firings off
the southwest Australian coastline near Albany on 20 June
1942. The results revealed tangible .evidence that the
torpedoes were running too deep. Lockwood passed this in-
formation along to the Bureau of Ordnance which belittled
the unscientific test environment. Lockwood rose to this
challenge and quickly scheduled a second trial off Albany on
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16 July. Once again the results showed an average running
depth of eleven feet deeper than specified. The submariner's
complaints were vindicated on 1 August 1942 when the Bureau
of Ordnance officially confirmed in its own tests off
Newport, Rhode Island that the Hark XIV tracked approximately
7
eleven feet deeper than set.
A second problem with the Mark XIV was the premature
detonations of some warheads before reaching the target. The
Mark XIV was fitted with a mechanism designed to arm the
torpedo warhead at a distance of approximately 450 yards from
the launching submarine. All too frequently the warhead
would explode shortly after reaching this self-arming point.
Sometimes the explosion showered the target in a geyser of
water, which from the restricted vantage point of a periscope
appeared to be a successful hit. "Premies" were a serious
threat to the survival of the attacking submarine since they
exposed the boat's relative position for effective anti-
submarine countermeasures, as well as alerting potential
victims to the nearby threat. Trial and error experience
eventually concluded that premature detonation resulted from
the effect of wave motion upon the over-sensitive detonator
mechanism.
A third mechanical flaw with the Mark XIV was found in
the gyroscope machinery which guided the torpedo on its
run to the target. Here the problem was the simple fact
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that the gyro could be locked Into position backwards result-
9in an erratic course run. Sometimes the absence of a design
safety feature to prevent gyroscope reversal resulted in an
armed torpedo circling back on the launching submarine.
Postwar U.S. Navy records list two boats lost as a result of
circular runs by their own torpedoes. 10
The most persistent and final torpedo defect to be
identified was the "dud". After overcoming all the tactical
and technical obstacles involved in obtaining a hit, the
torpedo simply failed to explode when it struck the target's
hull. The dud problem was clearly identified in an unusual
combat situation on 24 July 1943 when the U.S. submarine
TINOSA encountered the 19,000 ton tanker TONAN MARU #3
southwest of Truk. TINOSA's first salvo of four torpedoes
gained two observable bits. The converted whale oil factory
ship—fully loaded with petroleum oil—altered course thus
giving TINOSA's second salvo of two torpedoes a larger
firing angle, both of which struck the target and exploded.
The now disabled TONAN MARU #3 began settling by the stem
as TINOSA's puzzled skipper repositioned his vessel for a
deliberate textbook shot off the target's bean at a distance
of approximatly 875 yards. A single torpedo was launched
and apparently hit the target but failed to explode. Lieu-
tenant Commander L. R. "Dan" Daspit, his curiosity aroused,
proceeded to conduct a series of methodical single firings
-100-
from ideal ranges and with each torpedo individually inspected
before launching in an attempt to understand the cause of the
defective performances. The entire process from first salvo
to the last one took place over a period of five hours.
Except for the successful hits in the first and second salvoes,
all of TINOSA's complement of 16 torpedoes—save for the last
11
one which was kept for later analysis—were defective.
TINOSA's experience prompted Admiral Lockwood, now in
command of Submarines, Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to
conduct a new string of tests to discover the source of this
latest torpedo problem. A member of his staff, Captain Swede
Momsen, suggested the submerged cliffs on Kahoolawe Island
would provide an excellent "target" and the shallow waters
would enable investigators to recover the test "fish". In
August 1943, two separate shots were fired against the cliffs
and both of them exploded. However the third shot proved
to be a dud and when the armed weapon was delicately recover-
ed it was discovered the warhead had been crushed by the
impact. Inside the detonator mechanism the firing pin had
successfully traveled up the now bent guide track and had
actually hit the fulminate cap but with insufficient force
to achieve an explosion. Further testing on land dropped
dummy warheads containing the detonator mechanism from a
height of 90 feet onto a steel plate. The results disclosed
that at an angle of 90 , the optimum angle for attacking an
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enemy ship, the detonator failed every time. But when the
steel plate was slanted, duds were reduced by 50%. Conse-
quently the order went out to avoid attacking the enemy at
a 90° angle, the angle of attack long considered to be the
most ideal.
Japanese torpedoes during the Pacific War never succumb-
ed to any of the debilitating problems which plagued U.S.
torpedoes. Indeed, Japanese torpedoes "had the longest
ranges, the highest speeds, and the largest warheads of any
naval torpedoes" which saw combat in World War II. In all,
twelve torpedo models saw service during the war, most of
them as modifications of earlier designs. However, it was
the Type 95 Mod-1 and Mod-2 which carried the burden of
combat throughout the war.
The Type 95 torpedo was developed in 193S as the sub-
marine version of the surface-launched Type 93 "Long Lance".
This remarkable weapon carried 891 pounds of explosive and
was powered by a compressed oxygen/kerosene fuel mixture
which did not leave the normal bubble wake, thus making the
Type 95 a terrifying threat and exceedingly difficult to
detect. Furthermore, the 21-inch diameter torpedo was
capable of traveling 9,640 yards at a speed of 49 knots or
13,000 yards at 45 knots. But the Type 95 Mod-1 was not
entirely flawless and had difficulty maintaining pressuriza-
tlon in the oxygen tank. This problem led to the design
-102-
improvements found in the Type 95 Mod-2, which entered the
fleet in 1944. The Type 95 Mod-2 carried a larger warhead
(1,210 lbs.) a distance of 6,000 yards at 49 knots or 8,200
yards at 45 knots.
Japanese experience with submarine torpedoes differed
from the U.S. in one other respect. In June 1941, every
submarine in the Sixth Fleet test-fired a live torpedo
against the rugged shore-line of Oshima, a volcanic island
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south of Tokyo Bay. Virtually none of the U.S. submarine
commanders had ever fired an armed torpedo and were there-
fore ignorant of the weapon's destructive power.
By the autumn of 1943, the U.S. Navy's submarine service
had successfully overcome many of the difficulties which
had bedeviled operations in the months since Pearl Harbor.
Nearly two years of warfare had given senior commanders,
boat skippers, and their crews enough experience to unlearn
the ineffective and dangerous prewar doctrinal assumptions
about submarine combat. Stateside shipyards added 56 new
submarines to the fleet in 1943. These two factors
—
combat experience and increasing numbers—enabled the United
States Navy to mount more submarine patrols throughout
enemy controlled waters further complicating Japanese anti-
submarine operations. But it was the successful resolution
of the nagging torpedo problems which armed the silent
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service with a reliable weapon able to sink enemy ships. All
that remained in the process of imposing an undersea naval
blockade around the Japanese homeland was the capture of
suitable forward bases which would shorten the submarines'
transiting time and allow them to remain on patrol for longer
periods. Consequently in the autumn of 1943, preparations
were made for the Invasion of the Japanese-held Gilbert
Islands.
The amphibious assaults to retake the former British
Gilbert Islands—OPERATION GALVANIC—began on 21 November
1943. Ten fleet boats were deployed in support of the sur-
face elements in what Admiral Lockwood later noted was the
first time American submarines functioned as an integral
part of the fleet in a wartime operation. Their mission
was to locate and disrupt the expected enemy naval sortie
from Truk, approximately 1,600 miles west of the Gilberts.
However, much to the chagrin of the submariners, who were
eagerly anticipating ambushing Japanese warships, Lockwood
ordered all submarines making contact with unidentified and
numerous enemy surface units should first make a radio report
to headquarters before attacking. In this way he hoped to
avoid the possibility of the Japanese surprising an American
fleet tied down supporting the invasion landings, in the
event the attacking submarine was sunk before making a con-
tact report. In any case, this order was superfluous
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since the Combined Fleet did not sail to defend the Gilberts.
Japanese submarines did play an important, if disastrous,
role during OPERATION GALVANIC. Sixth Fleet commander, Vice
Admiral Takeo Takagi concentrated nine submarines in the
region. To do this he had to draw four boats away from
their patrol areas southwest of Hawaii and five more subma-
rines from their bases at Truk and Rabaul. Six of the nine
vessels were sunk, but in return for this heavy loss, the
Sixth Fleet defenders succeeded in sinking one American
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submarine and one escort carrier.
The fight for control of the Gilberts was indicative of
the rapidly changing fortunes within the Sixth Fleet. One
Japanese submarine captain, writing after the war, criti-
cised the Navy's High Command and its decision to rush nine
boats into the area since these hurried preparations did
not allow the careful planning necessary to give the sub-
marines a reasonable chance for success. In essence,
Japan's submarine defense of the Gilberts rushed a few
fragile warships into' an area of superior American naval
power, and did so in a haphazard fashion. Captain Hashimoto
observed that this sporadic commitment of limited submarine
forces resulted time after time in the gradual dissipation
of Japanese submarine strength. What was needed was a
careful evaluation of these "fire brigade" actions and the
effect they were having on the war effort.
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But poor strategy was not the only problem facing Japan's
Sixth Fleet. Evidence was already mounting that technological
weaknesses were adversely hindering the service's performance.
Among these deficiencies, Hashimoto noted the complete absence
of radar and radar detection devices aboard Japanese submarines.
Furthermore, the boats desparately needed Improved batteries
with greater endurance capability as well as a faster method
for recharging them. However the foremost need was the
immediate installation of radar technology aboard each subma-
rine.
Illustrating this deterioration in combat effeciency,
Hashimoto pointed to the experience of 1-174 during the
Gilberts battle. 1-174 was diverted from its resupply mis-
sions to New Guinea and later attacked by a coordinated U.S.
anti-submarine warfare team. The damaged vessel survived
a prolonged encounter albeit after receiving a severe beating
in the process. Arriving back in port, the commander of
1-174 commented in his report to Vice Admiral Takagi that it
was suicidal for Japanese submarines to operate against
coordinated enemy aircraft and destroyers without the aid of
radar in detecting these threats before they pounced. Un-
fortunately Takagi disagreed with this assessment only to
learn that I-174's frustrated skipper was not alone in hold-
this viewpoint.
In mid-January 1944, Admiral Takagi called a meeting
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aboard his flagship KATORI, anchored in Truk Lagoon, in
which he, his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Hisao Mlto, and
Operations Staff Chief Captain Chosaburo Takahashi heard the
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battle reports of several submarine commanders. Criticisms
were both numerous and harsh. The captains complained that
American radar was detecting their boats long before they
could get close to a target. Moreover, some submarine crews
had been committed to the battle when their physical exhaus-
tion should have kept them far from any combat area. Indeed,
one vessel sailed into harm's way with a new and inexperienced
crew. Finally, protested the battle-hardened veterans, the
enemy's advantages in air superiority and radar, coupled
together with the concentration of too many boats in too
small a geographic area, plus the demand by Sixth Fleet
Headquarters for frequent radio contacts, and the limitations
imposed by surface cruising in order to save battery power,
all combined to give the Americans a greater chance to locate
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and sink Japanese submarines.
Captain Zenji Orita expressed his opposition to assign-
ing submarines to attack enemy beachheads. He argued that
Japanese submarines lacked the underwater speeds needed to
elude surface pickets and since the local waters were well
screened, it was simply too difficult to obtain tactical
surprise. Orita suggested a better employment of the subma-
rine force would be in striking at the supply lines stretch-
-107-
lng across the sea from enemy naval bases to the beachheads
themselves. In this way, the submarines could indirectly
support island defenders while maintaing their advantages
in surprise and mobility against a less well-defended target.
Orita criticized the Japanese wolf-pack tactic which
deployed submarines close together in a sentry line formation.
This design assisted American anti-submarine operations by
reducing the size of the coverage area and increasing the
likelihood of multiple sinkings if one vessel was discovered.
A more suitable alternative would be a wider dispersal of
the boats. Orita maintained that the submarine was a weapon
of attrition and was best used in small attacks with results
measured over the long term rather than Immediately.
Orita emphasised the importance of immediately instal-
ling radar on board each submarine and the development of
effective electronic countermeasures which would neutralise
the enemy's surveillance systems. This was of particular
concern since the Japanese were dependent upon the attentive-
ness of topside lookouts armed only with a pair of excellent
120mm binoculars.
Captain Orita concluded with a call for change in
Sixth Fleet staff planning which required submarines to
maneuver tactically on the surface in order to utilize their
high surface speed. This characteristic was exceedingly
dangerous in light of the enemy's tremendous tactical
-108-
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advantage in radar detection.
The Pacific War's third full year—1944—proved to be
the period in which the tide of battle in the submarine war
turned decisively and irrevocably in favor of the United
States. By New Year's Day, the U.S. Navy had gathered to-
gether approximately 100 modern fleet submarines and divided
them among the three Pacific submarine commands. This
development simply meant the service was now able to maintain
a balanced operational approach to warfare in which approx-
imately one-third of the boats would be on station, one-
third would be in transit, and one-third would be in port
for crew rest, boat repairs, and training. Another way of
looking at this state of affairs: there were now enough
submarines in the Pacific to allow them to participate in
both missions supporting surface fleet operations and as
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commerce weapons striking Japanese shipping.
During fleet operations in 1944, American submarines
carried out several mission roles supporting the great central
Pacific push. These included a detailed photographic recon-
naissance of island beaches and gathering other intelligence
information useful in planning amphibious assaults. As
insular targets were selected for invasion, they were system-
atically isolated by an undersea blockade against shipping
bring reinforcements and supplies. Furthermore, once an
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invaslon force had sailed the submarines functioned as a
long-range screen searching for the enemy's fleet which might
be approaching for battle. In this capacity the boats pro-
vided both an early warning and an early threat to the
Japanese fleet. During the series of carrier raids on Truk,
the Marianas, and the Palaus, U.S. submarines were positioned
around the islands in hopes of intercepting any shipping
which might have escaped or fled the air attacks. Through-
out all the engagements in which naval airpower was used,
American submarines served as lifeguards for those pilots
shot down. The highpoint of this joint cooperation between
different branches of the U.S. Navy occured during the
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Battle of the Philippine Sea in June.
As the United States pushed its way across the central
Pacific, Japan's Sixth Fleet experienced frequent disruptions
and setbacks which seriously hampered its ability to defend
the Empire. Unlike the U.S., Japanese submarines were de-
ployed to strike enemy forces around the invasion beaches;
and as previously discussed, this course of action pitted
the fragile vessels against concentrated enemy anti-subma-
rine defenses. In contrast, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
sited his submarine forces around known enemy naval bases
and along the routes any Combined Fleet sortie might take to
attack his Fifth Fleet. This unwise Japanese tactical
feature was further aggravated when the Sixth Fleet command
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and control system suffered a major breakdown as a result of
the U.S. carrier raid upon the great naval base at Truk in
mid-February 1944. In that attack, U.S. aircraft sank the
Sixth Fleet's flagship, the 11,614-ton submarine tender
HEIAN MARU. The loss of HEIAN MARU interrupted Vice Admiral
Takagi's ability to coordinate and control an effective
defense against the American onslaught; but of inestimable
value was the loss of valuable spare parts and supplies
carried by HEIAN MARU which would have an impact upon future
submarine operations. As a result, on 6 May 1944 Admiral
Takagi temporarily moved his headquarters back to Japan and
abandoned Truk as a major base for submarine repairs and
crew rest. The Truk air strikes also forced the isolation
of the Japanese naval base at Rabaul thus trapping 100,000
troops and the large supply depots painstakingly built up
there and making that facility untenable as an advanced
submarine base for the Sixth Fleet. In response, Admiral
Takagi ordered all surviving Japanese submarines to with-
25draw from the south Pacific.
On 12 March 1944, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
changed its strategic planning for future operations. In-
stead of proceeding against the western Carolines, the em-
phasis would turn northward into the Marianas islands of
Guam, Tinian, and Saipan. These islands were needed as
bases for the Army's new strategic long-range bomber, the
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B-29, and an aerial offensive against the Japanese home
islands. With this shift in direction, the Japanese bases
at Truk and Rabaul became less important strategically and
consequently fewer submarines were needed to patrol from
the Allied naval base at Brisbane, Australia. Accordingly,
the Brisbane force was reduced to six submarines, three of
which were employed exclusively on special missions into the
Philippines. The remaining three boats operated against
enemy naval targets west of New Guinea where the Japanese
still had a foothold, or on other special assignments closer
to home. With this reduction in Brisbane's value as a sub-
marine base came a change in command: Captain James Fife,
Jr. was ordered to Washington, D.C. to assume new duties on
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Admiral King's staff.
Unlike the previous American amphibious assaults against
the Gilberts and Marshalls, the invasion of the Marianas did
not go unchallenged by Japan's Imperial Navy. At stake was
the inner strategic defense line of Japan's naval empire.
Japan's Sixth Fleet actively participated in the defense of
the Marianas with Admiral Takagi committing 22 submarines
to the fight, 17 of which did not survive the battle. Of
crucial influence to this heavy loss of boats and their
valuable crews was the presence of Sixth Fleet Headquarters
on the island of Saipan, one of the besieged strongholds.
Vice Admiral Takagi had previously withdrawn his headquarters
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from Truk to Japan's Kure Naval Base, located on the Inland
Sea, after repeated enemy carrier air strikes had made that
advanced facility unsuitable as a command base. However the
Sixth Fleet Headquarters did not long remain at Kure. On
5 June 1944 it was again moved to Saipan, ten days before
the U.S. invasion. Throughout the month-long struggle for
the island, several unsuccessful attempts were made to
rescue Admiral Takagi and his staff. On 2 July, Takagi
ordered these attempts to stop and four days later in a final
radio broadcast to the Sixth Fleet announced his intention to
lead his staff in a final suicide charge against enemy
positions. Exactly one week later, 13 July 1944, Vice Ad-
miral Shigeyoshi Miwa assumed command of the Imperial Navy's
Sixth Fleet. 27
By the end of July 1944, Japan's Sixth Fleet strength
was reduced to 26 operational submarines and a few assigned
as training vessels. Approximately 40 boats had been sunk
in the first half of 1944, in effect cutting the overall
submarine strength by half. Operational analysis concluded
that submarines fitted with radar or anti-radar equipment
had a better chance of survival than those boats not so
•quipped: one-third of the submarines with radar on board
sustained battle damage whereas two-thirds without radar
were lost completely. As a result, Admiral Miwa ordered
virtually the entire Sixth Fleet to return immediately to
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Japan for emergency installation of Japan's comparatively
primitive electronic technology. During this refitting
period, three submarines remained at sea on special missions
and Japanese submarine operations came almost to a complete
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standstill.
However the summer of 1944 marked a watershed time for
the Sixth Fleet. Due to the low priority given new subma-
rine construction, a different tactical employment had to
be found if Japanese submarines were to effectively partici-
pate in the defense of the Homeland. As one American
historian of the undersea war remarked, the months of June
and July marked the beginning of the end for Japan's subma-
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rine force. Like the Fleet's air arm, the Sixth Fleet
began to rely increasingly upon suicide weaponry as the
primary method for reversing the nation's declining fortunes.
From this period forward the Japanese began building midget
human torpedo submarines
—
Kaiten—in large numbers in
anticipation of the climactic battle for the home islands
and converting the remaining fleet submarines to carry the
new weapons to their targets. Since the use of a kaiten
in the open sea usually meant the sacrifice of the pilot's
life because the mother ship would be unable to recover him,
even if he survived his mission, only major naval combatant
warships were considered worthy targets for the deliberate
expenditure of a human life.
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The adoption of the human torpedo/kaiten weapon came at
an interesting time in the war. Although Japan's strategic
defense was sorely pressed by the growing might of U.S.
naval power, that maritime military power was now operating
at the end of an ever lengthening sea-borne supply line and
especially vulnerable to a successful submarine campaign of
attrition. If Japan's submarines had struck at the enemy's
sea lines of communication, particularly in the far eastern
Pacific where the anti-submarine defenses were weakest and
neglected from over-confidence, what advantage might have
been qained?
The possibilities of using Japan's rapidly diminishing
submarine force strategically against the relatively unde-
fended U.S. logistical shipping network were demonstrated
by the patrol of 1-12 in October 1944. 1-12 's mission was
to Interrupt American shipping in the waters between Hawaii
and the mainland United States. Sailing from Japan's Inland
Sea on 4 October, 1-12 proceeded in a lengthy detour through
the Sea of Japan and exited via the Tsugaru Strait separating
the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. During the long north-
ern passage across the Pacific, 1-12 maintained strict
radio-silence until 29 October when it sank an enemy ship
between Hawaii and San Francisco. The appearance of a
hostile submarine in an area long considered "safe" created
anxiety among U.S. anti-submarine warfare planners since the
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bulk of their specialized shipping were concentrated across
the Pacific in the heated battles on the road to Japan. 1-12 's
adventure ended abruptly on 13 November 1944 when a U.S.
Coast Guard cutter and minelayer attacked and sank it. Al-
though no other Japanese submarines operated in the eastern
Pacific during this same period, the spirit of the departed
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1-12 continued to make its presence felt into January 1945.
However in the autumn of 1944, the attention of both
Japan and the United States was focused upon the struggle for
control of the Philippines, since American reconquest of its
former colony would effectively divide the Japanese Empire
in half. As events moved towards the U.S. landings at
Leyte Gulf in late October 1944, Admiral Lockwood in Hawaii
ordered his submarines to avoid the entire Philippine Sea
east of the island of Luzon and south of the 20th Parallel
in order to prevent any mistaken attacks upon his boats by
friendly anti-submarine forces. With the Philippine Sea
off-limits, Pacific Fleet patrols shifted further north into
the seas off southern Japan and northern Formosa and surround-
ing the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyu Islands) in hopes of intercept-
ing any sortie by the Combined Fleet, as well as the contin-
ued relentless strangulation of Japan's merchant marine.
Admiral Ralph W. Christie's Fremantle submarines patrolled
the South China Sea and indirectly supported the Leyte land-
ings through anti-shipping operations, which isolated the
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region from reinforcement, as well as lifeguarding for downed
American carrier pilots. Some of Christie's boats became
critical links in the logistics chain as guerrilla activity-
expanded throughout the Philippines in anticipation of the
invasion. The value placed upon these increasingly important
supply missions was indicated by the prohibition against any
secondary offensive operations which might disclose the po-
sition of the submarine thereby endangering its primary
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mission of resupplying Filipino guerrillas.
Japan's Sixth Fleet mobilized its resources to partici-
pate in the defense of the Philippines. Following August's
inactivity in which the Navy General Staff had devised the
SHO plans to defend either the Philippines (SHO-1) or the
line stretching from Kyushu through the Ryukyu Islands to
Formosa (sho-2) from enemy invasion, the Sixth Fleet was
again ready to do battle with the United States Navy. By
September, 30 submarines were available for Admiral Miwa's
disposal. Of these, four were patrolling the Indian Ocean
from their forward base at Penang, Malaya and six were
involved in transporting supplies to isolated garrisons.
Many of the remainder were being fitted to carry kalten
.
Unfortunately for the planned southern deployment, an
incident on 12 September dramatically altered the Sixth Fleet's
ability to sustain operations in the Philippines. Admiral
William F. "Bull" Halsey's Third Fleet made a series of
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hit-and-run carrier air strikes against enemy positions and
one of these raids destroyed the Sixth Fleet's diesel fuel
stocks on the island of Cebu. This setback forced Japanese
submarines to return to Japan for all their refuelling needs
and disrupted their ability to participate in the Philippine
33defense structure.
In association with their support of fleet operations
in 1944, U.S. submarines intensified their war of attrition
against Japanese maritime shipping in an effort to weaken
the enemy's economy and disrupt attempts to support the far-
flung insular empire. Several factors contributed to this
increased activity in the "raaru war", not the least of which
was the simple fact that U.S. shipyards and training facili-
ties were turning out large numbers of submarines and men. to
crew them. With more submarines available came a greater
degree of flexibility in their deployment against the enemy's
vulnerabilities. Japanese shipping also helped in its
annihilation through a growing tendency to convoy shipping as
a means of defending itself against the depredations of
lurking enemy submarines. This development plus the growing
number of U.S. boats encouraged American commanders to ex-
periment with the German-pioneered strategy of wolf-packing:
guiding several boats under one operational commander to a
specified convoy target. Furthermore, the entire efficiency
of the wolf-pack concept was made possible because of the
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highly reliable Intelligence information used in guiding the
wolf-packs to their victims.
During the first half of the Pacific War, Japan failed
to quickly recognize the degree to which its mobilised econ-
omy and war machine depended upon the efficient use and
security of sea lanes across vast distances of ocean. Fun-
damentally speaking, Japan's anti-submarine defensive strategy
suffered from a complete absence of organization and a low
emphasis on protection. * Merchant shipping was distributed
among three institutions each of which jealously guarded its
parochial interests: the Army, the Navy, and the Ministry
of Munitions. During the days of conquest in which the
empire rapidly expanded, Army and Navy shipping sailed from
Japan loaded with troops and supplies only to return to the
Home Islands empty. Likewise, civilian shipping under the
Ministry of Munitions commonly sailed for the Southern Re-
sources Area in ballast, that is empty, and returned home
with holds loaded with raw materials. No effort was ever
made to coordinate the limited number of available ships to
insure that holds were always filled in the most efficient
manner. Petroleum tankers were idled during the early stages
of the war until the Dutch East Indies oil fields were
captured by advancing troops and their facilities returned
to service by Japanese technical experts. On the naval
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side, no consideration was given to protecting merchant ship-
ping from enemy submarine attack. Indicative of this failure
in threat perception was the Combined Fleet's priority control
over all destroyers within the fleet; commerce protection by
this vessel class was considered a secondary mission. In
addition, destroyer captains and crews were mentally condi-
tioned and operationally trained for fleet battles and found
protecting merchant ships contemptible. Finally, Japanese
merchant captains were reluctant to sail in convoy since this
procedure frequently entailed delays in departure until
enough ships could be gathered together and Joined with an
armed escort. Accordingly, Japanese merchant ships tended to
sail alone for the sake of efficiency.
In late 1943, Japanese officials took steps to repair
the damage caused by their flagrant disregard of the American
submarine threat. On 14 November the Grand Escort Command
was formed with a complement of 50 vessels and under the
command of Admiral Koshiro Oikawa. Oikawa's force was
further strengthened in December with the formation of the
901st Naval Air Flotilla, built around four escort carriers
and trained exclusively for convoy escort and anti-submarine
warfare duty. Unfortunately the 901st was plagued throughout
its lifetime with untrained aircrews; and once these pilots
had developed their flying skills to a relatively proficient
level of competency, they were almost immediately shanghaied
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for service aboard Combined Fleet carriers. To assist his
command's capability to defend Japanese shipping. Admiral
Oikawa suggested the construction of an enormous mine barrier
stretching from the Home Islands to Borneo behind which the
Japanese merchant marine could sail in safety. This novel,
if extravagant and pershaps desperate idea, was eventually
vetoed by the Navy General Staff on account of the strategic
mine reserves were needed for protection from the Soviet
36
Union in the event it entered the war against Japan.
Early Japanese attempts at convoying merchant shipping
further aggravated their problems and played directly into
the hands of U.S. submariners. Unlike the Allied experience
in the Atlantic Ocean, Japanese convoys were small in size,
usually three or four vessels. This feature basically
compromised the strategic need to gather ships together for
protection and the individual captains' collective desire to
keep regular sailing schedules. The net effect was to spread
what few escorts were available too thinly in an effort to
protect everybody everywhere. This dissipation of escort
defenses was compounded by the fact that Japanese shipbuild-
ers did not emphasize construction of anti-submarine vessels
for added convoy protection. Thus a chronic shortage was
endemic throughout the war. Furthermore, even when a U.S.
submarine attacked an unescorted Japanese convoy, the ships
usually did not immediately scatter formation, making
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follow-up attacks much easier since all the targets were still
in a relatively limited area. This behavior could conceivably
result in the destruction of an entire convoy by a single
submarine provided there were no torpedo problems, all shots
hit their targets, and the warship had enough torpedoes to do
37
the job.
By early 1944, it was obvious that Japan faced a two-
pronged military threat from advancing American forces:
Nimitr through the central Pacific and MacArthur along the
island chain from Australia to the Philippines. Hoping to
support the remaining island fortresses and thus bolster
Japan's strategic left flank, the Grand Escort Command began
organizing larger convoys with greater escort protection to
counter the depredations of enemy submarines. Those convoys
headed for the Marianas were designated Matsu (pine tree)
and those directed towards New Guinea were referred to as
Take (bamboo). This choice of words in the Japanese lan-
guage suggested the larger convoys would symbolically be
38
"as strong as pines and tough as bamboo."
This new emphasis on protecting convoys did not result
in any reduction in individual sinkings since many vessels
still sailed independently. By mid-1944 Japan lost an
average of 50 ships each month to U.S. submarines. This
number converted into about 200,000 tons of shipping removed
39
monthly from sustaining the Japanese war effort. Of
-122-
particular concern was the growing losses among the petro-
leum tanker fleet, now singled out for systematic destruction
by submarines. In the first half of 1944, 43 oil tankers
totalling approximately 335,000 tons of shipping had been
sunk, 27 (189,000 tons) by submarine alone. All but some
40,000 tons of this loss was replaced by new construction
and conversion during the same period. However the important
element in the entire picture was the steady decline in
total oil imports reaching Japan: from one million barrels
40
in January to 600,000 barrels in June. Further undermin-
ing the convoy effort was the increasing shortage of escorts
available for duty. But perhaps the most subtle and far-
reaching casuallty of the maru war was among Japanese mer-
chant seamen who became more fearful as their chances of a
successful voyage steadily declined. Just as important,
many of these sailors were marooned on distant, isolated
islands unable either to return home or use their desperately
41
needed skills on what ships were operational.
As Japan turned towards a convoy strategy to protect
the dwindling merchant fleet, this factor allowed U.S.
submarine commanders to use the wolf-pack techniques so
successfully demonstrated in the Atlantic. Wolf-pack tactics
greatly increased the size of area covered because each
member of the pack patrolled its own sector, yet remaining
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within easy supporting distance of other members in the
group. This deployment concentrated more firepower on the
targeted convoy or fleet group and added confusion to the
enemy's anti-submarine response. Wolf-packing also reinforced
the individual submarine commander's self-confidence and
42
encouraged him to act aggressively by means of peer pressure.
The formulation of a wolf-pack strategy in May and
June 1944 among Pacific Fleet submarines was an outgrowth of
the close, efficient cooperation carefully built up during
the war between the Commander, Submarines Pacific Fleet and
the Estimate Section of naval intelligence in Hawaii. This
marriage flourished because of the physical limitations of
the war rone in which most submarine patrols generally lasted
two months, in turn requiring extensive administrative pre-
parations and planning well in advance of departure dates.
This long lead time, plus the knowledge that Japan had erect-
ed a formidible mine barrier between Kyushu and Formosa—
a
barrier through which a safe and reliable passage had yet to
be discovered—restricted U.S. submarines to the deep waters
of the Pacific Ocean. In light of these limitations,
Lockwood's operations chief, Captain Richard G. Voge pro-
posed an experiment utilizing wolf-packing techniques in
the vicinity of the Marianas Islands. The entire project
hinged upon the Estimate Section's ability to give accurate
information from the broken maru code and guide the subma-
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rine to various convoys in the area. Otherwise, the subma-
rines would waste a great deal of time searching for targets
when a more profitable deployment would place them closer to
major island fortresses such as Saipan where enemy shipping
would naturally converge. One drawback with this terminus
strategy was the increased likelihood that American wolf-
packs would tangle with stronger enemy anti-submarine
defenses not present throughout a long voyage. Moreover,
the submarines would have only one opportunity to strike at
a convoy as it neared the end of its journey and came under
the protection of strong naval forces. But if the intel-
ligence infrastructure could successfully guide the wolf-
packs to a mid-ocean rendezvous with an enemy convoy, the
advantages of attritional warfare could be brought to bear
on the hapless convoy. However even this possibility carried
a hidden danger. If the Japanese suddenly changed the maru
code, the entire intelligence process would be blinded and
unable to position U.S. submarines in the most effective
manner. Lockwood elected to accept this risk factor and
deployed his boats in mid-ocean. The result vindicated his
decision when Japanese convoys running the undersea gauntlet
43
suffered heavy losses.
By 1 January 1945 the Japanese merchant marine had
been reduced to 1.927 million gross tons of dry cargo ship-
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ping still afloat. This figure equaled the barest minimum
needed to feed the Home Islands from Chinese and Manchurian
agricultural sources. The submarine noose had so tightened
around Japan that the Grand Escort Fleet had ceased its
attempts to organize convoys importing raw bulk cargoes into
the islands. Virtually all shipping sailed independently
with most of the Southern Resources Area traffic consisting
of oil tankers.
44
By March and April 1945 the United States'
submarine war against Japan had largely ended. During those
months the Army Air Force began an aerial mining campaign
using B-29 strategic bombers to completely cut the water-
borne traffic between Japan and the Asian mainland.
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During the years between World War I and World War II,
diplomats representing the world's great naval powers met
together in a series of arms control conferences intent
upon reducing international tensions associated with rampant
warship construction. The arms limitation process began in
Washington, D.C. in 1921-22 when delegates agreed to restric-
tions on capital shipping, the standard by which contemporary
naval power was measured. However the treaty system was
initially hampered by the failure to reach agreement on
secondary warship categories, most notably cruisers and
submarines. The issue of submarines proved particularly
elusive to negotiation, with positions ranging from outright
abolition to legal constraints governing wartime use. In the
end, the naval arms limitation process terminated when the
political constituency supporting its existence evaporated
and was replaced by militant elements hostile to any in-
fringement upon national sovereignty.
At the same time, naval strategists in the United States
and Imperial Japan debated the most likely war scenarios
involving each other in a Pacific Ocean conflict. The some-
times heated discussions were tempered by the restraints
imposed around the peace table. Both sides identified the
submarine as a prominent element in their respective war
plans and consequently sought designs and built submarine
fleets suitable to fulfilling these tentative conceptions.
In December 1941, the tension between Japan and the U.S.
boiled over into war in the Pacific. Japan's initial
assaults virtually destroyed American offensive naval power
with the exception of the submarine fleet. But the submarine
war envisioned by both sides never materialised. Instead,
both services endured similar problems of strategy and
tactical employment which severely reduced their war-fighting
capabilities. U.S. submarines in particular suffered for
nearly two years with a torpedo plagued by numerous technical
deficiencies which made the weapon completely unreliable.
The essential difference which determined the final
outcome in the submarine war was that the United States
learned from its mistakes while Japan did not. By the time
America's torpedo problems were resolved, the U.S. Navy had
accumulated enough submarines in the Pacific to embark upon
a devastating campaign against Japan's commercial shipping
industry. Japan never fully realized the critical importance
of its merchant marine in supporting both the war effort and
the nation's domestic economy. As a result, the Imperial
Japanese Navy failed to take timely steps to bolster the
defenses surrounding this vital link and consequently expe-
rienced the trauma connected with its destruction.
By the spring of 1945, U.S. submarines had so ravaged
Japan's merchant marine that it almost ceased to exist as a
factor in sustaining the nation. The tremendous contribution
of American submarines in gaining final victory and Japan's
shattering negligence in achieving a reciprocal accomplish-
ment with its own underwater service suggests the importance
of submarine warfare in the Pacific Ocean during World War II.
While the submarine is a weapon of attrition, with results
measured over time, one cannot help but speculate on the
final duration of the Pacific War had the United States not
been crippled by persistent torpedo problems and had chosen
to concentrate its submarine strength against Japan's vulner-
able petroleum shipping early in the conflict. Conversely,
how might Japan's situation have been enhanced if its sub-
marine fleet had been directed against the U.S. logistical
system rather than squandered in politically motivated, but
irrelevant^ missions resupplying isolated and bypassed island
fortresses? Although the answers to these questions are
intriguing to naval historians and armchair strategists,
they indicate the powerful role submarine warfare played in
the Pacific War.
